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ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
SUMMARY
F OR ALMOST AS long as airplanes have existed, federal
courts have been challenged by the question of whether torts
involving airplane crashes over navigable waters are cognizable
in maritime law. A cause of action for wrongful death did not
exist under general maritime law until the Supreme Court al-
lowed recovery for loss of support, funeral expenses, conscious
pain and suffering, and loss of services in Moragne v. State
Marine Lines, Inc.,1 overruling the previous law of The Harris-
burg.2 Beginning with Executive Jet,3 courts have attempted to de-
fine aviation torts within a maritime law context. Locality and
substantial relationship tests developed to evaluate maritime law
claims. However, even if maritime law is applied, damages re-
coverable may differ if the death occurs on the high seas, in
state territorial waters, or somewhere in between. Damages
available under substantive maritime law are not uniform or
consistent. Both the status of the claimant and the location of
the occurrence make the only certainty a need to examine each
case closely to determine the extent of damages recoverable.
This paper addresses the need to establish uniformity and equity
by applying general maritime law to commercial aviation acci-
dents over navigable waters.
I. INTRODUCTION
It was the worst news a wounded nation could hear-an air-
plane destined for Santa Domingo crashed shortly after taking
off from New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport.4
On November 12, 2001, American Airlines Flight 587, with 246
passengers and nine crew members aboard, went down in the
Rockaway section of New York City. The wreckage was scattered
over half a mile, including parts of the plane splashing down in
Jamaica Bay.
The horror of aircraft accidents continues to haunt the mod-
ern world. The pictures of such tragedies remain vivid in our
consciousness, reminding us of our vulnerability to random trag-
I Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc, 398 U.S. 475 (1970).
2 The Harrisburg v. Richards, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
3 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
4 See David Johnston & James Risen, The Crash of Flight 587: The Investigation;
Officials Find No Clear Signs of Terrorism in Crash, But No Firm Answers Either, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at Al; Karen Freifeld, Who They Were-The Victims of American
Flight 587, NEWSDAY, Nov. 28, 2001, at B6; Sibylla Brodzinsky, Dominican Celebration
Somber, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 2001, at 9D.
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edy. "The speed, mobility, and range of modern aircraft.. .and
the resulting multi-state or multi-nation contacts with aircraft
supply, operations, and accident or incident,"5 means that in
any one aviation case, it is likely that several legal systems may
appear applicable.6 From the time of the first airplane crashes,
courts have struggled with both the appropriate choice of law to
be applied, and the range of remedies available to compensate
victims and their families. Grief-stricken families mourn the loss
of the victims. Unfortunately, they soon learn that the legal
remedies for their loss may be just as turbulent as the crash that
took the lives of their loved ones.
December 17, 1903 marked the beginning of the aerospace
industry, with the world's first powered, sustained, and con-
trolled flight by Orville and Wilbur Wright at Kitty Hawk.7 The
"Flyer" was assembled with a variety of rudimentary components,
including loose bicycle parts. Following the success of the
Wrights, airplane manufacturing grew rapidly.8 The need for
aviation law would quickly follow. More than 100 years later, the
jurisprudence of aviation accidents is just as unsettled as it was
in the beginning. The law to be applied and the damages
awarded depend upon where the plane crashes. However, if the
crash occurs in, on, or over water, the remedy may depend upon
where you started, where you were going, and where the flight
ended. To this day no clear legal framework exists for asserting
federal jurisdiction over aviation torts.9 Typically, aviation torts,
especially commercial airline, land in federal courts through di-
versity, federal question, or admiralty jurisdiction. Admiralty ju-
risdiction may be applied by virtue of the Death on the High
Seas Act (DOHSA).'° The assertion by a plaintiff of admiralty
jurisdiction may provide procedural and substantive advantages
not available in federal or state courts when other grounds are
claimed. DOHSA provides a statutory basis for the admiralty ju-
risdiction determination.
5 See Stuart M. Speiser & Charles F. Krause, 1 AVIATION TORT LAW 60 (1978).
6 Id.
7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL AIRCRAFr 7 (David Donald ed., 1999).
8 Id. The first regular passenger service operated in Florida in 1914. Follow-
ing World War I, several countries used converted military aircraft to transport
cargo, mail, and passengers. By the late 1920s, commercial aircraft was coming of
age with the emergence of new technology and design. See id. at 7-8.
9 See Vance E. Ellefson, Here There Be Dragons, 33rd Annual SMU Air Law





Jurisdiction becomes clouded when the accident occurs
within territorial waters. Here, in the absence of specific laws,
the federal courts have relied on a number of tests to determine
when admiralty law should control the case. It is in the context
of this myriad of legal resources for aviation accidents occurring
over navigable waters that this paper addresses the need for ap-
plication of maritime law to aircraft-related litigation.
In many instances, maritime law affords the best remedy for
airline crashes because it promotes legal process efficiency, the
fair and universal treatment of claims, and uniform legal analy-
sis. Further, plaintiffs are frequently afforded a more fair and
more complete recovery. The long history of admiralty law sug-
gests that all damage remedies are available-including punitive
damages, if not otherwise supplanted by the Warsaw Conven-
tion, DOHSA, or other treaty and federal law. Part II discusses
the early history of admiralty law, and the statutory and constitu-
tional application of admiralty to early jurisprudence in the
United States. In Part III, the discussion of the modern era of
aviation litigation begins with Executive Jet, and proceeds
through the "Trilogy" cases that form the foundation for later
Supreme Court decisions regarding maritime jurisdiction. Part
IV discusses implications of the Warsaw Convention on damage
awards. Part V explains provisions of the Death on the High Seas
Act, including its interaction with admiralty jurisdiction. The
consequences of the application of maritime law to aviation liti-
gation are examined in Part VI, beginning with the recognition
of wrongful death actions following the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Moragne. The panoply of available damages is compared,
including pecuniary, non-pecuniary, punitive, and survival ac-
tions. Finally, Part VII concludes with the contention that all
aircraft litigation over navigable waters should be heard under
the auspices of admiralty law. This is the best remedy for univer-
sal treatment and fairness of claims, and serves to expedite re-
covery for plaintiffs through a more efficient legal process.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
A. EARLY PRECEDENT
Commerce and maritime law share a centuries-old history.
Evidence of maritime commerce in the Persian Gulf, the Ara-
bian Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea has been found through
the translation of hieroglyphic writings in ancient tombs as early
20031
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as 2000 B.C.' I The writings indicate that rules existed to govern
commerce.' 2 Modern maritime law is based upon the Rhodian
Sea Codes.1" This set of codes identified and governed the
rights and responsibilities of ship owners and seamen. The Rho-
dian Sea Codes also dealt with the relationship between ship
owners and the parties for which they transported cargo. 4
Although maritime laws and issues have existed for centuries,
the foundation for American maritime law can be found in the
rules of England. 5 Separate sets of rules and laws governing the
unique aspects of maritime commerce developed to govern
transportation in navigable waters. 6 Beginning in the four-
teenth century, England established a Court of Admiralty to de-
cide maritime cases.'" By 1611, Sir Edward Coke succeeded in
restricting the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Courts to cases in-
volving vessels on the high seas or within the ebb and flow of the
tide on rivers.'" This served to severely limit the jurisdiction of
the English Admiralty Courts.19
With the colonization of the New World, admiralty courts
were established in each of the Colonies.2 ' Each of the courts
acted independently of the other colonial courts, and the colo-
nial admiralty courts were much more expansive than their En-
glish counterparts.2 1  The courts in the Colonies assumed
jurisdiction over every case that had some connection to a mari-
time matter.22 In addition, the colonial admiralty courts were
expected to enforce the collection of duties and taxes for the
English Crown through the English Navigational Act. 23 Need-
less to say, this aspect of the colonial admiralty courts was ex-
11 See 1 BENEDICT ON ADMiRALTYv § 2 (Stephen F. Friedell et. al. eds., 7th ed.
2000).
12 See id. § 2. See also 1 THOMASJ. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw
3 (2d ed. 1994).
13 See BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 11, at § 3.
14 See id. § 2.
15 See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 12, §§ 1-6, at 16-18.
16 Id.
17 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 11, at § 21.
18 See id. § 43.
19 Id.
20 See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 12, §§ 1-6, at 16-18.
21 See id.
22 See id. at 17. Issues included seamen's rights, piracy cases, captured cargo




tremely unpopular, and it was quickly dropped with the advent
of the Revolutionary War.24
B. FEDERAL AUTHORITY-CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS FOR ADMIRALTY AND
MARITIME JURISDICTION
Maritime cases were given a unique and significant place in
the laws of the United States. Article III, Section 2 of the Consti-
tution states: "The judicial power [of the United States] shall
extend . . . to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion ... ",25 No other classification received this type of specific
legal treatment.26 Historical records indicate that the Founding
Fathers were interested in having a uniform judicial system for
admiralty cases to improve international trade and commerce.2 7
Alexander Hamilton emphasized the necessity for maritime laws
with a national uniformity. Thirteen independent courts of fi-
nal jurisdiction over the same causes, arising from the same
laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contra-
diction and confusion can proceed. 28 According to Hamilton,
even the most adamant states' rights advocates had not denied
the need for a national legal forum for maritime issues. These
issues generally depend on the laws of nations, and commonly
affect the rights of foreigners, thus they fall within the consider-
ations which are relative to the public peace. The most impor-
tant part of them is by the present confederation submitted to
federal jurisdiction. 2
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction granted in the Con-
stitution was implemented by Congress with the enactment of
the Judiciary Act of 1789.30 Following passage of the Judiciary
24 See generally DAVID R. OWEN & MICHAEL C. TOLLEY, COURTS OF ADMIRALTY
IN COLONIAL AMERICA (1995), for a detailed account of the courts.
25 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
26 See generally U.S. CONST.; See also BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 11,
§ 105.
27 See id.
28 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
29 See id. at 536.
30 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of
the States, of (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to
suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is
competent to give it." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77. The cur-
rent statutory language is substantially the same except it changes the last phrase
to "in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333 (2001). 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3)(2001).
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Act, admiralty cases were segregated by the federal district
courts from other areas of jurisdiction, and were processed on
their own "admiralty docket."'" In 1966, the admiralty and non-
admiralty dockets merged pursuant to the general provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 2 The assertion of admi-
ralty jurisdiction follows procedural rules, and the claim for ad-
miralty is either a claim in which the grounds for admiralty
jurisdiction is the only claim for the suit, or it can be the prod-
uct of a special pleading even when other jurisdictional options
are available." In the event the court finds no basis for admi-
ralty jurisdiction, and no other grounds for federal jurisdiction
exist, the suit will be dismissed. 4
C. AVIATION LAW AND EARLY TREATMENT BY THE COURTS
Technological advancements out-pace the law. It should
come as no surprise that courts grappled with how to handle
early aviation incidents. In the context of maritime activities,
the Supreme Court settled on two distinct requirements for
finding a case within the provisions of admiralty.
1. Locality of the Tort
The federal courts struggled for many years with the restricted
English maritime jurisdictional rules. In Thomas v. Lane,15 Jus-
tice Storey stated the principle previously adopted by English
courts:
31 See generally GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 19
(2d ed. 1975); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§
2301-2322 (1999).
32 See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 31; WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 2301-2322 (1999).
33 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide specific rules regarding admi-
ralty and maritime claims. Rule 14(c) proscribes the treatment for third party
impleader. Rule 38(e) states that the right to a trial by jury is not created in
admiralty. Foulk v. Donjon Marine Co., Inc., 144 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 1998); Debel-
lefeuille v. Vastar Offshore, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 821 (S.D. Tex 2001) (not specifi-
cally forbidding a jury trial for admiralty claims). See Palischak v. Allied Signal
Aerospace Co., 893 F. Supp. 341, 351 (D. NJ. 1995); FED. R. Crv. P. 82 (jurisdic-
tion and venue of admiralty unaffected by rules and not treated as a civil action).
FRCP SUPPLEMENTAL RULES FOR CERTAIN ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS RULES
A-F (amend. 2000).
34 FED R. CIv. P. 9(h). "If the claim is cognizable only in admiralty, it is an
admiralty or maritime claim for purposes whether so identified or not." Id. It is
to the plaintiff's advantage to plead admiralty jurisdiction so that the admiralty
claim may be asserted later.
35 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (C.C.D. Me. 1813) (No. 13, 902).
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In regards to torts I have always understood, that the jurisdiction
of the admiralty is exclusively dependent upon the locality of the
act. The admiralty has not, and never [I believe] deliberately
claimed to have any jurisdiction over torts, except such as are
maritime torts, that is such as are committed on the high seas, or
on waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.3 6
However, the Court later settled on a broader construction
for purposes of defining maritime jurisdiction.3 7 In 1851, Chief
Justice Taney rejected the English tidewater, ebb and flow limi-
tation, declaring in The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,8 that all
waters that could be used in interstate or foreign commerce
were navigable waters within the maritime jurisdiction of the
United States.3 9
2. Navigable Waters
Once the locality of the wrong was established, the courts
again had to determine whether they would follow the doctrine
of the English courts, or define navigable waters more expan-
sively. The Court answered the issue in the negative. The local-
ity test was expanded in The Plymouth,4 ° to include not only
tidewaters (the ebb and flow doctrine of English law), but also
any navigable waters, including lakes and rivers:
[T]he wrong and injury complained of must have been commit-
ted wholly upon the high seas or navigable waters, or, at least, the
substance and consummation of the same must have taken place
upon these waters to be within the admiralty jurisdiction ... The
jurisdiction of the admiralty over maritime torts does not depend
upon the wrong having been committed on board the vessel, but
upon its having been committed on the high seas or other navi-
gable waters . . . Every species of tort, however occurring, and
whether on board a vessel or not, if upon high seas or navigable
waters, is of admiralty cognizance.4"
36 Id.
37 DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 441 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3, 776).
"[WIhatever may in England be the binding authority of the common law deci-
sions upon this subject, in the United States we are at liberty to re-examine the
doctrines, and to construe the jurisdiction of the admiralty upon enlarged and
liberal principles." Id.
38 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851) (involving a collision on Lake Erie).
39 Id.
40 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 35-36 (1866). In The Plymouth, embers from a river
steamboat flew off and set a dock and warehouse on fire. The wrong occurred on
navigable water, but the damage occurred on land. Id.
41 Id.
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The requirement that the tort must have been committed
"wholly upon the high seas or navigable waters" would be heavily
challenged, and later overruled. The locality test remains an in-
tegral part of any admiralty jurisdiction discussion.
3. Admiralty Extension Act and Other Maritime Issues
The locality test created difficulties in the application of admi-
ralty law to certain situations. Generally, personal injuries occur-
ring on land could not be heard under admiralty jurisdiction.
But maritime law has allowed recovery to seamen (maintenance
and crew) who were injured in the course of their connection to
service to their vessel.4 2 The doctrine of unseaworthiness also
allows recovery to a seaman injured when the cause of the injury
stems from defects in the vessel or its equipment. 43
Congress also extended admiralty jurisdiction through the
Admiralty Extension Act 44 to specifically overrule cases that pre-
viously did not provide a remedy for damage inflicted to land
structures by ships on navigable waters: "The admiralty and mar-
itime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and in-
clude all cases of damage or injury, to person or property,
caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such
damage or injury to be done or consummated on land. '4 5 The
Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act of 1948 overruled the
specific holding in The Plymouth. It was thought the Plymouth
analysis had advantaged vessels over landowners. A wrong com-
mitted on land to a vessel could be brought in admiralty, but the
wrong committed by the vessel on land could not. Often, a
landowner could not find a basis to gain jurisdiction of any form
over a vessel. The Extension Act erased this line between land
and water, investing admiralty jurisdiction over 'all cases' where
the injury was caused by a ship or other vessel on navigable
water, even if such injury occurred on land.46
42 See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 688, 41 Stat. 1007 (2002).
43 See Guitierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
44 46 U.S.C. § 740 (2001).
45 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 260 (1972). See Law-
rence D. Bradley, Jr., The Supreme Court and Maritime Jurisdiction, 25 MAR. LAw.
207, 220 (2000).
46 Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 532 (1995) (refer-
encing Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1963); Executive
Jet, 409 U.S. at 249).
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4. Early Aviation Case Law-How Airplanes Became Involved in
Maritime Law
Maritime law developed to handle legal matters involving ves-
sels that traded in commerce.47 The locality test presented an
interesting dilemma to courts in aviation decisions. A district
court declined admiralty jurisdiction to an airplane that crashed
into Puget Sound because it was not a maritime vessel.48 If a
vessel was not involved, then there was no maritime jurisdic-
tion.49 A dry dock, fixed in place, but floating on navigable wa-
ters did not obtain maritime jurisdiction.50  A partially
constructed vessel floating in navigable waters was not within
maritime jurisdiction.5' Thus, by 1920, the Supreme Court had
determined that only a vessel on navigable water would obtain
admiralty jurisdiction.52
The first Supreme Court case to analyze an airplane crash on
navigable water was Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corpora-
tion. In Reinhardt, a man was injured when he attempted to
prevent a hydro-plane, moored in navigable waters, from drift-
ing ashore.54 Justice Cordoza, issued a ruling for the New York
Court of Appeals stating the hydro-plane was a vessel within the
meaning of maritime jurisdiction only when it was operating on
the water.55
We think the craft, though new, is subject, while afloat, to the
tribunals of the sea. Vessels in navigable waters are within the
jurisdiction of admiralty. Any structure used, or capable of being
used, for transportation upon water, is a vessel . . . A hydroaer-
oplane, while in the air, is not subject to admiralty ... or so at
least we may assume, because it is not then in navigable waters,
and navigability is the test of admiralty jurisdiction . .. we think
the jurisdiction of admiralty is not less where the structure found
afloat is seaplane and aeroplane combined. It is true that the
47 See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 12, §§ 1-2, at 3.
48 See Foss v. Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 F. 269, 271 (W.D. Wash. 1914) (No.
1564) (airplane damaged in the crash and brought ashore for repairs).
49 Id.
50 See Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625 (1887). "The fact that it
floats on the water does not make it a ship or vessel..." Id. at 627.
51 See Francis McDonald Thames Towboat Co. v. Francis McDonald, 254 U.S.
242 (1920).
52 See 2 BENEDICT ON AD IRALTY § 2, 1-6 n. 7 (Steven F. Freetail et. al., eds., 7th
ed. 1986) for an in-depth survey of cases following the strict locality rule.
53 133 N.E. 371 (N.Y. 1921).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 372.
2932003]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
primary function is then movement in the air, and that the func-
tion of movement of water is auxiliary and secondary. That is,
indeed, a reason why the jurisdiction of the admiralty should be
excluded when the activities proper to the primary function are
the occasion of the mischief. It is no reason for the exclusion of
jurisdiction when the mischief is traceable to the function that is
auxiliary and secondary. Collision does not cease to be collision
and peril of the sea because the structure is amphibious. 6
Justice Cardozo thus excluded any aircraft not operating on
navigable waters from maritime jurisdiction. 57 In 1935, the
Ninth Circuit followed Justice Cardoza's opinion, and found
that a seaplane was within admiralty jurisdiction while afloat on
navigable waters. 51 In 1939, an aircraft crashed in navigable wa-
ters while flying from New York to Bermuda and was found not
to be a vessel for purposes of maritime jurisdiction.5 9 The Sec-
ond Circuit, however, decided a seaplane that had run out of
fuel, forced to land on shore, and later picked up by a passenger
ship, was to be treated as a vessel and given maritime jurisdic-
tion in 1954.
III. MODERN ERA-EXECUTIVE JET AND BEYOND
Justice Cardoza's view of excluding aviation accidents from
maritime jurisdiction was gradually discarded.60 Accidents in
state territorial waters were found to fall within maritime juris-
diction. Prior to 1972, the test for admiralty jurisdiction was es-
sentially the locality test developed in The Plymouth.6' The strict
locality rule was highly criticized, however, because cases
reached the federal courts based solely upon the fortuitous cir-
cumstances of the aviation occurrence.6 2
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See United States v. Northwest Air Serv., 80 F.2d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1935).
5" SeeNoakes v. Imperial Airways, 29 F. Supp. 412, 413-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). The
plane was equipped to land and take off on water, but presumably since the crash
occurred on descent from the air it did not qualify.
60 See Lawrence D. Bradley, Jr., The Supreme Court and Maritime Jurisdiction, 25
MAR. LAw. 207, 227 (Winter 2000).
61 See supra note 42.
62 For discussions and criticisms of the locality test, see Carolyn Daigle Wiggins,
Admiralty Jurisdiction Related to Maritime Aviation Accidents, 48J. AIR L. & CoM. 179
(1982); Birdwell & Whitten, Admiralty Jurisdiciton: The Outlook for the Doctrine of
Executive Jet, 1974 DUKE L.J. 757 (1974);James F. Mosely, Did That Airplane Affect
Admiralty: Executive Jet and its Aftermath, 25 FED. INS. COUNS. Q. 319 (1975); Admi-
ralty Jurisdiction: Executive Jet in Historical Perspective, 34 OHIo L.J. 355 (1973).
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A. THE EXECUTIVE JET STANDARD
The modern era of aviation tort law commenced with the
benchmark decision in Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland.3
This case concerned an aircraft that struck and ingested a flock
of seagulls into one of its jet engines as it was taking off from
Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland, Ohio.64 The airplane was
en route to pick up passengers for a charter flight in Portland,
Maine with the ultimate destination of White Plains, New York.65
The airplane crashed into Lake Erie, and although no injuries
occurred, the plane sank and became a total loss.66 The owners
of the aircraft invoked admiralty jurisdiction in their suit against
the City of Cleveland for negligence in failing to keep the air-
port free of birds.67 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio's dismissal of the suit
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.6" On certiorari, the Su-
preme Court upheld the dismissal of the case by deciding that
no admiralty jurisdiction existed in the case.69 In the Supreme
Court's view, jurisdiction could not be based upon an accident
that was "only fortuitously . . .connected to navigable waters"
and bore "no relationship to traditional maritime activity."70
Further, the Court observed that the voyage was land-based and
would not have duplicated a voyage that could have been taken
on navigable waters by a vessel.71
Instead of deciding which party had the strongest locality ar-
gument, the Court focused on the nature of the wrong.7 2 Most
63 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
64 Id. at 250.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 250-51. Assertion of federal admiralty jurisdiction enabled the aircraft
owners to circumvent the statue of limitations imposed by Ohio statute. See also
Jonathan M. Gutoff, Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Asbestos Torts: Unknotting the Tangled
Fibers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 312, 316 (1987).
6 Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 450-51.
69 Id. at 261.
70 Id. at 273.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 268. In describing the difficulties of properly applying the locality test,
the Court explained:
The case before us provides a good example of these difficulties.
The petitioners contend that since the aircraft crashed into the nav-
igable waters of Lake Erie and was totally destroyed when it sank in
those waters, the locality of the tort, or place where the alleged
negligence took effect, was there. The fact that the major damage
to their plane would not have occurred if it had not landed in the
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instructional, however, was the Court's discussion of the history
of admiralty law, and the Court's concern that a "purely
mechanical application" of the locality test created special
problems in aviation torts. 73 Criticizing the exclusivity of the lo-
cality test, the Court added a new emphasis in aviation torts, by
requiring that the "wrong bear a significant relationship to tradi-
tional maritime activity.""
With this new standard, plaintiffs in aviation tort cases could
no longer be certain of asserting admiralty jurisdiction-even if
the tort occurred in navigable waters.7 5 The Executive Jet ruling
presented a new, but obvious problem: What constitutes a tradi-
tional maritime activity? 76 The Court provided some guidance
with the example of an event that would not meet the requisite
maritime relationship-a land-based plane that crashed during a
flight from one point in the continental United States to an-
other point.7 7 At the same time, the Court did not foreclose the
possibility that an airplane duplicating the function traditionally
performed by waterborne vessels might come within admiralty
jurisdiction.7 8 The Court stated that a flight that crashed in the
ocean between New York and London would be encompassed
lake indicates, they say, that the substance and consummation of
the wrong took place in navigable waters. The respondents, on the
other hand, argue that the alleged negligence took effect when the
plane collided with the birds-over land.
Id. at 266-67.
73 Id. at 261.
74 Id. at 268.
We conclude that the mere fact that the alleged wrong 'occurs' or
'is located' on or over navigable waters-whatever that means in the
aviation context-is not of itself sufficient to turn an airplane negli-
gence case into a 'maritime tort.' It is far more consistent with the
history and purpose of admiralty to require also that the wrong
bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.
Id.
75 In making the distinction between the two theories of the parties, the Court
concluded that "[t] hese are hardly the types of distinctions with which admiralty
law was designed to deal." Id. If the locality was determined by the location of
the crash, then crashing in Lake Erie would allow admiralty jurisdiction, but
crashing on the runway would not. On the other hand, if the activity of the plane
striking the birds is the determining factor, then if the plane struck the birds as it
passed over the shore, admiralty jurisdiction would be present, even if the plane
returned to land and crashed there. If the birds were struck while still over the
airport, admiralty would not be present. Id. at 267-68.
76 See Carolyn Daigle Wiggins, Admiralty Jurisdiction Related to Maritime Aviation
Accidents, 48J. AIR L. & CoM. 179, 192 (1982).
v7 Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 271.
78 Id.
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by admiralty jurisdiction since "[a]n aircraft in that situation
might be thought to bear a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity because it would be performing a function tra-
ditionally performed by waterborne vessels. ' 7  The Court
hinted that legislative action would be necessary for a claim in
this context to survive a jurisdictional challenge.8"
The Court emphasized that to make decisions based upon
where the plane crashed, or where the act of negligence oc-
curred, would find admiralty tort jurisdiction depending upon
circumstances "that could be wholly fortuitous and completely
unrelated to the tort itself."'81 Torts that have involved technol-
ogy not traditionally viewed as related to maritime posed a prob-
lem that could find federal courts extending maritime
jurisdiction into "factual and conceptual inquiries unfamiliar to
the law of admiralty."82
The only issue specifically resolved in Executive Jet was that
there was no federal admiralty jurisdiction in aviation cases that
arise from land-based flights between points within the conti-
nental United States.8" Ultimately, the Court's failure to define
"traditional maritime activity" forced courts to struggle with the
application of the Executive Jet standard.84
79 Id. (citing Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970)). Hornsby
involved a collision of two aircraft used to spot schools of fish. Both planes
crashed into the Gulf of Mexico within one marine league of the shore of Louisi-
ana. The basis for allowing maritime jurisdiction in Hornsby was that the aircraft
were performing a function traditionally performed by vessels in navigable wa-
ters. Hornsby, 431 F.2d at 866-67.
80 Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 268. "It may be as the petitioners argue, that avia-
tion tort cases should be governed by uniform substantive and procedural laws
and that such actions should be heard in the federal courts... But for this Court
to uphold federal admiralty jurisdiction in a few wholly fortuitous aircraft cases
would be a most quixotic way of approaching that goal." Id. at 274.
81 Id. at 267.
82 Courts are historically forced to apply common law principles to new con-
cepts due to technological advances. For a unique case dealing with advanced
technology and the application of maritime jurisdiction, see T.J. Falgout Boats,
Inc. v. United States, 508 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1974). Here, a land-based naval jet
released a Sidewinder missile (a short-range air-to-air missile) prior to crashing.
The missile struck and damaged a fishing boat. Owners of the boat brought a
claim against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Ninth
Circuit dismissed the FTCA claim, but held that admiralty jurisdiction applied.
The Ninth Circuit observed that "it [could] not be said that the navy plane's
activity over water in the instant case was entirely 'fortuitous' as was the plane
involved in Executive Jet." Id. at 857.
83 Executive Jet, 489 U.S. at 271.
84 See generally Federal Courts-Admiralty Jurisdiction-Maritime Locality Plus Maritime
Nexus Required to Establish Admiralty Jurisdiction in Aviation Negligence Cases-Executive
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B. APPLYING THE EXECUTIVE JET STANDARD TO
AvIATION ACCIDENTS
Following Executive Jet, district courts initially resolved the
traditional maritime activity standard in several ways. Focusing
on the definition of "significant maritime relationship," most
courts would structure their decisions into classifications and
language that included a functional approach, employing a "lo-
cality plus" test, or an activity-based test. 5 .While the analysis
would differ, the fulfillment of both the locality test and the
nexus requirement would be scrutinized, often with different
results.
1. The Navigable Waters Locality Prerequisite
In Brown v. Eurocopter, S.A., 86 the locality test was challenged.
A helicopter pilot was killed when the helicopter developed
mechanical difficulties and crashed into an oil platform, then
plunged into the sea.8 7 The pilot's widow claimed that maritime
law and DOHSA did not apply because the crash occurred over
the oil rig. The court disagreed, stating that the "[1]ocality in-
quiry is relatively simple. Contrary to the argument made by
Plaintiff, the precise point of a plaintiff's death is not the
lynchpin for determining whether the locality requirement is
satisfied. Instead, the Court looked to whether the alleged neg-
ligence 'became operative while the aircraft was on or over navi-
gable waters."' 88  The court determined that since the
helicopter began experiencing problems over the Gulf of Mex-
ico, the occurrence forming the basis of the claim clearly satis-
fied the locality element.89
Similar results occurred in Morgan v. United Air Lines, Inc.9"
The Morgan plaintiffs were surviving passengers who sued the
airline for emotional distress following the aircraft's sudden de-
Jet Aviation, Inc., v. City of Cleveland, B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 1071 (1973); Hops,
Skips, and Jumps Into Admiralty Revisited, 39J. AIR L. & COM. 625 (1973).
85 See Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 523 n.3 (5th Cir. 1974). "The
Supreme Court in Executive Jet ... discussed the difficulties inherent in deter-
mining tort locus in the aviation context, but the Court did not propose another
test." Id. (citing Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 266-68).
86 38 F. Supp. 2d 515 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
87 Id. at 516.
88 Id.
89 Id.
9 750 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Colo. 1990).
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compression on a flight between Hawaii and New Zealand."
The Colorado district court adopted recommendations of a
United States magistrate, who concluded that the maritime law
requirements to show that the tort occurred "on or over naviga-
ble waters ... [was] clearly met here," even though the aircraft
and its passengers did not "hit" the water.92 Further, the court
determined that general maritime law did not allow emotional
distress damages, and more importantly, held that general mari-
time law did not preempt Colorado law in this Warsaw case.93
In re Air Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii,9 4 was a case that arose
out of the same decompression event as Morgan. In this case,
the plaintiff passengers sought to avoid admiralty jurisdiction by
claiming that although the incident occurred over navigable wa-
ters, the aircraft did not crash, but instead was able to return to
Honolulu.9 5 The court agreed it was "fortuitous" that the cargo
door blew off while the plane was over water rather than land,
but found that the degree of "fortuosity" was no different than if
a mechanical failure occurred on land but caused the aircraft to
crash into the high seas.96 In applying maritime jurisdictional
law, the court said plaintiffs were unsuccessful in dispelling "set-
tled precedent that air accidents occurring over the sea and in-
volving transoceanic flights .. .are maritime in nature."9 "
2. The Maritime Nexus-The Significant Relationship to Maritime
Activity Test
The Supreme Court case that most directly deals with aviation
as a maritime activity is Executive Jet. Although Executive Jet held
that admiralty jurisdiction is not appropriate when a land-based
aircraft flies from one point to another within the continental
United States, the Court suggested there could be circumstances
91 Id. at 1048. While the plane was over the high seas, a cargo door blew off
the aircraft. Many passengers were injured and several were killed. Id.
92 Id. at 1053.
93 Id. See also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986); Wil-
liams v. United States, 711 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1983); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United
States Dist. Ct., 698 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1983) (meeting the location requirement
because exposure to asbestos occurred while on navigable waters).
94 792 F. Supp. 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
95 Id. at 1543-44.
96 Id. The "fortuosity" analogy springs directly from Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at
261.
97 In re Air Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii, 750 F. Supp. at 1544.
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in which an aviation tort could come within admiralty
jurisdiction.9"
It is the area between Executive Jet and the obvious application
of admiralty law in a plane crashing over the high seas that con-
tinues to challenge the courts. After Executive Jet, lower courts
generally applied admiralty jurisdiction to aviation torts if they
occurred over navigable waters. Some courts decided that a
transoceanic flight, by definition, would meet the traditional
maritime nexus requirement.99 Other courts looked to the
functionality of the aircraft to find the required nexus. 00
In Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc.,1" 1 the court delivered two rea-
sons for supporting the similarities between maritime and avia-
tion activity:
Generally speaking, both aviation and marine law deal with com-
plex mechanisms, and the legal terminology for analyzing this
machinery is sufficiently similar that the two bodies of law may be
compared with profit. For example, "airworthiness" and "seawor-
98 Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 271.
99 A transoceanic flight meets the function traditionally performed by water-
borne vessels. See Ledoux v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 609 F.2d 824 (5th Cir.
1980); Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 524 (5th Cir. 1973) cert. denied sub. nom.;
Chicot Land Co. v. Kelly, 416 U.S. 969 (1974); Williams v. United States, 711 F.2d
893 (9th Cir. 1983); Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974); T.J.
Falgout Boats, Inc. v. United States, 508 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1000 (1975); Miller v. Lewis, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,912 (11th Cir. 1984);
Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-Vought Inc., 513 F. Supp. 314 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Hammill
v. Olympic Airways, S.A., 398 F. Supp. 829, 832 (D.D.C. 1973); Higginbotham v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973), affd. in part, 545 F.2d 422
(5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); Hubschman v. Antilles
Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828, 841 (D.V.I. 1977).
100 For examples of cases where the courts found maritime jurisdiction, see
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 219 (1986) (A helicopter fer-
rying passengers from an offshore drilling platform to the shore was engaged in a
maritime function using the rationale a helicopter could replace what once was
done only by ship); Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1147 (2d Cir. 1976)
(maritime jurisdiction extends to Coast Guard aircraft performing rescue opera-
tions); Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Tech. Corp., 722 F. Supp. 942 (D. Conn.
1989) (If a maritime nexus was required, it existed here where the aircraft was
manufactured for use in marine rescue and other maritime operation); Comind,
Companhia de Seguros v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div. of United Tech. Corp., 116 F.R.D.
397 (D. Conn. 1987) (The crash of a helicopter used to ferry passengers and
supplies to off shore drilling structures satisfied nexus requirements); Hark v.
Antilles Airboats, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.V.I. 1973) (Maritime nexus exists in
the takeoff of a float plane similar to water vessels). But see New York City v.
Waterfront Airways, 620 F. Supp. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (The crash of a float plane
over land does not meet the Executive Jet maritime nexus test, and court did not
find maritime jurisdiction).
101 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.V.I. 1973).
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thiness" are not dissimilar; and the Rules of the Road and the
doctrine of the "last clear chance" are also akin in the two con-
texts. The second reason is more narrow... aviation torts ought
to have the benefit of the relatively flexible doctrine of laches,
and ought not to be confined within a brief and unyielding stat-
ute of limitations. An aircraft crash is far more complicated than
the ordinary tort and it is more like a marine accident in that it is
followed by a lengthy official inquiry. A litigant may wish to await
the results of this investigation and should... be permitted to do
SO. 1
0 2
Hark involved a sea plane that crashed into the St. Thomas
harbor, when one of its engines lost power.1"' The plaintiff pas-
senger sued under admiralty jurisdiction for his injuries caused
by the accident.0 4 The court found that the admiralty jurisdic-
tion was proper and described the two ends of a continuum re-
garding the application. Admiralty jurisdiction is properly
applied when a "seaplane is floating on the water [because] it
is... then subject to the ordinary rules of navigation. '0 5 At the
other end of the continuum, was the Executive Jet scenario. °6
The court concluded that even a seaplane incident might not
invoke admiralty jurisdiction if the cause of the incident is too
attenuated from its role as a "marine vehicle." 107
Teachey v. United States, °8 is illustrative of the importance of
case-specific facts in determining whether admiralty jurisdiction
can be applied. A Florida district court utilized a functional ap-
proach to hear the case of a Coast Guard helicopter that
crashed on land, after rescuing a fisherman from his sinking
boat in the Gulf of Mexico.0 9 Teachey argued that the helicop-
ter had been acting in a capacity traditionally reserved for sea
vessels, and thus warranted admiralty jurisdiction.1 10 The court
102 Id. at 688.
103 Id. at 684. All passengers were rescued with no loss of life.
104 Id. at 685. The court noted that the statute of limitations for state action
had tolled, hinting that this might be the reason for seeking admiralty jurisdic-
tion. Id.
105 Id. "[A]n amphibious airplane crash can support an action for a maritime
tort, at least where the plane has not fully completed the takeoff phase of its
flight and been brought under control as an airborne vehicle." Id.
106 Admiralty jurisdiction is not proper when "a land-based plane is disabled
during a primarily overland flight" even of it fortuitously crashes into navigable
waters. Id.
107 Id. (citing United States v. Northwest Air Serv., 80 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1935)).
108 363 F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1198.
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agreed he was operating as a sea vessel, but disagreed that it
justified admiralty jurisdiction."' Instead, the court focused on
the fact that the crash had occurred after a refueling stop and
the completion of the rescue operation. 112 Thus, the court de-
termined that the relationship to maritime activity had
ceased."' This limited application requires the vessel seeking
admiralty jurisdiction to be performing the functional
equivalent to a sea vessel at the time of the incident. 14
The Fifth Circuit adopted this posture in LeDoux v. Petroleum
Helicopters."5 The court determined that a helicopter being
"used in place of a vessel to ferry personnel to and from offshore
drilling structures, bears the type of significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity" required for admiralty jurisdic-
tion. " 6 Due, in part, to both the type of cases heard by the Fifth
Circuit and implied in the decisions, is the sense that claims aris-
ing from helicopter accidents have a better chance for success in
seeking maritime jurisdiction than do passenger planes." 7
Under the functional approach, a helicopter crash may result in
maritime jurisdiction application, but a single-engine plane per-
forming a similar function might not."'
III Id. at 1198-99.
112 Id. at 1199. Following the rescue, the helicopter landed at Key West. No
one disembarked. The helicopter then departed for St. Petersburg, Florida, and
crashed just off the coast of St. Petersburg. All of the passengers were killed-
including Teachey. Id.
113 Id. "The mere transportation of the decedent from one Coast Guard base
to another does not constitute a sufficient act of performing a function tradition-
ally performed by waterborne vessels so as to bring it within the dictum statement
enunciated in Executive Jet." Id. The court contended that the flight from Key
West to St. Petersburg was merely a land-based flight made between two destina-
tions in the continental United States. Id. (relying on what it deemed the dictum
of Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 274). Neither the fact that a plane goes down on
navigable waters nor the fact that the negligence "occurs" while a plane is flying
over such water is enough to create such relationship to traditional maritime
activity as to justify the invocation of admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 1198-99.
114 Id. at 1199.
115 609 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curium).
116 See Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973),
affd in part, 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618
(1978) (holding that a helicopter fulfilled the maritime relationship requirement
because it was ferrying passengers to an offshore rig, which is a duty that was
typically performed by a sea vessel).
117 Id.; Teachey, 363 F. Supp. at 1199.
I's See Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
969 (1974), in which the Court held that the functions and roles of the parties
are determinative factors in deciding whether admiralty rules would apply. See
also Mancuso v. Kimex, 484 F. Supp. 453, 454 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (admiralty jurisdic-
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Most significant is the implementation of the Fifth Circuit's
four-prong analysis to determine the significant relationship to
maritime activity in Kelly v. Smith." 9 According to this test, the
court must examine the facts by looking at: "the functions and
roles of the parties; the types of vehicles and instrumentalities
involved; the causation and the type of the injury; and the tradi-
tional concepts of the role of admiralty law." 20 It should be
noted that the dissent agreed with both the threshold factors
and the four-prong standard to determine whether the signifi-
cant relationship had been met. 121 However, the dissent did not
agree that admiralty jurisdiction was appropriate and believed
the federal interest should not pre-empt the application of Mis-
sissippi law. 12
2
In Roberts v. United States,'23 the Ninth Circuit chose a different
two-prong approach to determine admiralty jurisdiction.1 24 Of
course, it is reasonable to assume the significant relationship to
maritime activity may be more readily applied when the United
tion allowed because the plane was being used to carry cargo from the United
states to Jamaica); Hayden v. Krusling, 531 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Fla. 1982) (land-
based plane disappeared while flying from New Orleans to Pensacola, and was
deemed not to have a significant relationship to maritime activity even though it
was carrying passengers and its last known location was fifty miles from the Gulf
of Mexico shoreline).
119 Kelly, 485 F.2d at 525. The plaintiffs in Kelly were deer poachers hunting on
a private hunting preserve located on an island in the Mississippi River. As they
were departing the island in a small boat, they were hit by gunfire originating
from shore. Defendants in the case were the individuals who fired the shots, the
manager of the hunting preserve, and the island's owner. Jurisdiction was based
upon diversity and admiralty. Id. at 521. Admiralty jurisdiction was important
because the remaining issues would be barred by the Mississippi statute of limita-
tions if based upon diversity. The Fifth Circuit decided that to be maritime, a tort
must occur on navigable waters and bear a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity. Id. at 524 (relying on Executive Jet and Peytavin v. Gov't Employ-
ees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972)). To determine if the action had the
necessary relationship, the court created the four part test. In applying the crite-
ria, the Fifth Circuit determined that the party most severely injured was the
boat's pilot. This status was established by his responsibility to safely navigate the
boat. Id. at 525-26. "Policy militates toward admiralty jurisdiction in this case.
The admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts stems from the important national
interest in uniformity of law and remedies for those facing the hazards of water-
borne transportation." Id. at 526.
120 Id. at 525.
121 Id. at 527.
122 Id. at 527-28. This conclusion is important because it highlights the tension
between state interests and federal law.
123 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1975).
124 Id. at 523.
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States Navy is a party. 25 In Roberts, a cargo plane crashed into
navigable waters 2000 feet from the runway at the United States
Air Base in Okinawa. 126 The Ninth Circuit could have chosen
the functionality test, but instead imposed additional require-
ments to the functional characteristics of the activity, by looking
at "the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved; the cau-
sation and the type of the injury; and the traditional concepts of
the role of admiralty."' 127 Thus, in Roberts, the Ninth Circuit
found admiralty jurisdiction by combining what they called the
"geographic realities" of the locality of the incident,128 with the
characteristics of the cargo planes purpose of the transoceanic
transportation of cargo. 129 When it decided that Executive Jet did
not preclude a maritime action on the facts presented, the ap-
pellate court also noted that "before the advent of aviation, such
shipping could only be performed by waterborne vessels.""13 In
actuality, the Ninth Circuit applied the functionality test.
Admiralty jurisdiction was also found through the locality plus
standard in a series of incidents involving seaplanes in the Vir-
gin Islands. 3' Takeoff and landing problems experienced by
the seaplanes were held to be sufficiently related to maritime
activity to impose admiralty law. 13 2
3. Narrow Construction-A Plane Is Not a Vessel
In the most restrictive construction of the traditional mari-
time activity definition, some courts restricted application, not
to the functional equivalent, but rather to an absolute or obvi-
ous maritime connection. For example, a Pennsylvania district
court did not find admiralty jurisdiction in the crash of a plane
that carried passengers from Atlantic City, New Jersey to Block
Island, New York.'33 The court interpreted the Executive Jet hold-
125 In contrast to a case involving a private aircraft, a Navy aircraft is by "its very
nature maritime." TJ. Flagout Boats, Inc. v. United States, 508 F.2d 855, 857 (9th
Cir. 1974).
126 Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974).
127 Id. at 523 (citing Kelly, 485 F.2d at 525).




131 See Hark v. Antilles Airboats, 355 F. Supp. 683, 684 (D.V.I. 1973); Hubsch-
man v. Antilles, 440 F. Supp. 828 (D.V.I. 1977).
132 Hark, 355 F. Supp. at 685.




ing very narrowly, and questioned whether an aviation accident,
under any facts or circumstances, should be the subject of admi-
ralty suits."3 4
The district court in Fosen v. United Technologies Corp.,13 5 ap-
plied the activity based test to find admiralty jurisdiction when a
helicopter transporting passengers to an oil rig crashed thirty
miles from the coast of Norway. 13 6 The court found that the
accident was "probably related closely enough to extensive off-
shore operations to fall within the Court's admiralty
jurisdiction.' 113 7
4. Merging Analysis and Inconsistent Decisions
By the early 1980s, the various tests continued to produce in-
consistent results. 138 Judges seemed willing to find admiralty ju-
risdiction in aviation tort claims, even though some courts
preferred to limit maritime jurisdiction to only those cases that
fell within specific statutory provisions. 139 In 1982, the Fifth Cir-
cuit reviewed maritime law and aviation issues in Smith v. Pan Air
Corp.14° Two suits were combined into one decision. Claim one
involved the death of a pilot, who was killed when the seaplane
he was piloting crashed into Louisiana soil as he returned from
ferrying passengers engaged in mineral exploration. 4 The sec-
ond claim arose from the death of a helicopter pilot who trans-
ported oil rig workers to and from platforms in the Gulf of
Mexico. 4 2 As the pilot took off from the platform, the helicop-
ter was struck by a crane ball and crashed into the Gulf, killing
134 Id. at 658. The fact that Block Island could only be reached by air or water
could have easily garnered admiralty jurisdiction under the functionality test, and
so the decision could have been very different in another court.
135 484 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 496.
138 SeeJOHNJ. KENNELLY, THE EVALUATION OF AN AvIATION CASE FOR THE STAND-
POINT OF THE PLAINTIFF 3-4 (Juanita M. Mayetiola ed., 1987). See also Kyle Brac-
kin, Salvaging the Wreckage: Multi-District Litigation and Aviation, 57J. AIR L. & CoM.
655, 702-07 (1992).
1B9 SeeJoHNJ. KENNELLY, THE EVALUATION OF AN AVIATION CASE FOR THE STAND-
POINT OF THE PLAINTIFF 3-4 (Juanita M. Mayetiola ed., 1987); Kyle Brackin, Salvag-
ing the Wreckage: Multi-District Litigation and Aviation, 57J. AIR L. & CoM. 655, 702-
07 (1992).
140 684 F.2d 1102 (1982).
141 Id. at 1104.
142 Id. at 1105.
3052003]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the pilot. 4 ' In both cases, the district courts dismissed the
claims for lack of admiralty jurisdiction.144
In the first claim regarding the seaplane, the Fifth Circuit up-
held the dismissal of the suit.'45 The determinative factor was
that the seaplane had crashed into an inland marsh rather than
navigable waters. 46 In the second claim, utilizing reasoning
similar to its earlier decisions, the Fifth Circuit found admiralty
jurisdiction in the helicopter accident claim.'4 7 Finding that the
wrongful death could be heard in admiralty solely based upon
DOHSA was sufficient to grant jurisdiction. 48 But the court
took its reasoning one step further and allowed examination of
the property claim as well, extending admiralty jurisdiction to
non-death claims so long as the flight had an "essential maritime
nexus."' 49 The appellate court reasoned that even though the
locality test must always be satisfied, 'judicial economy" allowed
litigation of both the wrongful death and the property claims in
the same court.15 °
Smith v. Pan Air succeeded in establishing maritime locality as
an absolute requirement for any aviation tort to achieve admi-
ralty jurisdiction.' 5 ' The Fifth Circuit's four-prong test gained
favor, and was adopted by the Third, Fourth, Ninth and Elev-
enth Circuits.'52 The Supreme Court would later criticize the
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 1108.
146 Id. This meant that the appellate court disregarded both the function of
the seaplane and the relationship of the wrong to the traditional maritime activ-
ity. The court held, however, that "[m]aritime locality is still an indispensable
element of maritime jurisdiction." Id.
147 Id. at 1111. "[A] dmiraltyjurisdiction has repeatedly been extended to cases
in which death or injury occurred on navigable waters even though the wrongful
act occurred on land. The place where the negligence or wrongful act occurs is
not decisive. The place injury occurs and the function the injured person was
performing at the time are more significant." Id.
148 Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (2002).
149 Smith, 684 F.2d at 1112.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1108. The appellate court reasoned that the combination of the Exec-
utive Jet decision and the Supreme Court's reference to the Fifth Circuit's opinion
in Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982), afg 641 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.
1981), led to the conclusion that "maritime locality is still an indispensable ele-
ment of maritime jurisdiction ..." Smith, 684 F.2d at 1108.
152 See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. United States, 846 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 490 (1988); Oman v. Johns-Manville, 764 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir.
1985) ("a thorough analysis of the nexus requirement should include a consider-
ation of at least the [Kelly factors]"); Bubla v. Bradshaw, 795 F.2d 349, 351 (4th
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test(s) as unnecessary, and determine that a general analysis was
preferential.'
C. THE TRILOGY-THE SUPREME COURT EXPANDS THE
MARITIME ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE JET
1. Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson
In an effort to "resolve the confusion in the lower courts re-
specting the impact of Executive Jet Aviation," the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to hear Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richard-
son. '54 The resulting decision expanded the Executive Jet "signifi-
cant relationship to maritime activity" requirement from the
aviation context to the general field of maritime torts.' 55 In a
five-four split decision, the Supreme Court allowed the imposi-
tion of admiralty jurisdiction in a pleasure boat collision on a
small Louisiana river.1 56 The district court found no admiralty
jurisdiction because it reasoned that "traditional" meant "com-
mercial," and thus the accident involving the pleasure boats
could not and did not meet the guidelines for admiralty jurisdic-
tion. 157 The Fifth Circuit 58 and the Supreme Court disagreed.
The Supreme Court found that the collision of the pleasure
boats satisfied the locality test.' 59 Further, the Court determined
that the pleasure boat collision satisfied the substantial relation-
Cir. 1986) (exclusively applying Kelly factors); Solano v. Beilby, 761 F.2d 1369
(9th Cir. 1985); Crotwell v. Hockman-Lewis Ltd., 734 F.2d 767, 768 (lth Cir.
1984). The test has been used to both uphold and deny admiralty jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit, in Molett v. Penrod Drilling Co., 826 F.2d 1419, 1426 (5th Cir.
1987) ("Molett I") added three factors to the Kelly factors. The appellate court
looked at "the impact of the event on maritime shipping and commerce, the
desirability of a uniform national rule to apply to such matters, and the need for
admiralty 'expertise' in the trial and decision of the case." Id.
153 See Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995).
154 457 U.S. 668-69 (1982), affg 641 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1981).
155 Id. at 674.
156 Id. at 677.
157 Id. at 671.
158 Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 641 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1981).
159 The Court stated:
The express holding of Executive Jet is carefully limited to the par-
ticular facts of that case. However, the thorough discussion of the
theoretical and practical problems inherent in broadly applying the
traditional locality rule haws prompted several courts and commen-
tators to construe Executive Jet as applying to determinations of
federal admiralty jurisdiction outside the context of aviation
torts .... We believe that this is a fair construction. Although Exec-
utive Jet addressed only the unique problems associated with ex-
tending admiraltyjurisdiction to aviation torts, much of the Court's
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ship to traditional maritime activity test because the pleasure
boats should be required to navigate according to the same
rules as commercial vessels, and pleasure boat collisions on navi-
gable waters have the potential to disrupt maritime
commerce. 1
60
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Powell was concerned
with the Court's "erosion of federalism."'16 The dissent main-
tained that pleasure boating was too new to be "traditional" for
the purposes of the "significant relationship to maritime activ-
ity" test. 162 He suggested that an airplane resting in Lake Erie
had a far greater potential to disrupt maritime commerce than a
"toy boat" collision on a tiny Louisiana river.163 For the dissent,
the bottom line was that "[f]ederal courts should not displace
state responsibility and choke the federal judicial docket on the
basis of federal concerns that in truth are only 'imaginary.' 164
The dissenting justices would have required a direct connection
between the pleasure boats and maritime commerce. 165
2. Sisson v. Ruby
Eight years after Foremost, the Supreme Court took its next
maritime jurisdiction case. In Sisson v. Ruby,166 a fire erupted on
a yacht that docked at a marina on Lake Michigan. 16 7 The fire
destroyed the yacht and damaged several other vessels in the
marina. 68 The yacht owner invoked the Limited Liability Act
provision, which limits a vessel owner's liability for any damage
done without the owner's knowledge, and sought federal juris-
diction.'69 The district court and Seventh Circuit found an in-
rationale in rejecting strict locality rule also applies to the maritime
context.
Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 673 (citations omitted).
160 Id. at 677.
161 Id. at 678.
162 Id. at 680-81.
163 Id. at 689.
164 Id. at 685-86 (quoting Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51
CAL. L. REv. 661, 709 (1963)).
165 Id. at 677-86 (Powell, J., dissenting).
166 497 U.S. 358 (1990).
167 Id. at 360.
168 Id.
169 Id. If applicable, the provision would have limited the owner's maximum
liability to the salvage value of the yacht, which was $800. Claims by the marina
and owners of the other damaged yachts totaled over $275,000.
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sufficient relationship to "traditional maritime activity," and
dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction. 170
The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that all of the
requirements for maritime jurisdiction were met. 171 The locality
test was easily satisfied since the incident had occurred on Lake
Michigan, a navigable waterway.' 72 The first half of the test, re-
quiring proof that there was a potential hazard to disruption of
maritime commerce was met, since the fire could have spread
from the noncommercial vessels to commercial vessels and
could have interfered with travel on the navigable waters. 
173
To meet the second half of the test, the Court found that the
storage and maintenance of a vessel in a marina was a relevant
activity to successfully reach the "substantial relationship to
traditional maritime activity" requirement. 174 The Court enun-
ciated a generalized approach by stating that "our case ha[s]
made clear that the relevant 'activity' is defined not by the par-
ticular circumstances of the incident, but by the general con-
duct from which the incident arose."
'175
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed there was mari-
time jurisdiction, but suggested that the Court return to the sim-
ple reasoning of Executive Jet.' 
76
The sensible rule to be drawn from our cases, including Execu-
tive Jet and Foremost, is that a tort occurring on a vessel con-
ducting normal maritime activities in navigable waters-that is, as a
practical matter, every tort occurring on a vessel in navigable wa-
ters-falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.' 77
170 In re Sisson, 663 F. Supp. 858, 860 (N.D. Ill. 1987), affd, 867 F.2d 341 (7th
Cir. 1989), rev'd, sub nom., Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990).
171 Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363.
172 Id. at 362.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 365.
175 Id. at 364.
176 Id. at 388 (Scalia, J., concurring).
177 Id. at 368 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated in Executive Jet, the
Court had devised the "significant relationship to traditional maritime activity"
for torts involving aircraft, not vessels. Id. In his opinion, "that test does not add
any new substantive requirement for vessel related torts, but merely explains why
all vessel-related torts [which ipso facto have such a 'significant relationship'],
but only some non-vessel-related torts, come with 1333(1)." Id.
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3. Analyzing the Trilogy-Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co.
In Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 7 the
Supreme Court delivered a lengthy opinion that reviewed its
opinions in Executive Jet, Foremost, and Sisson-the trilogy of mari-
time jurisdiction cases.'79 The Grubart case concerned the un-
derground flooding of basements of businesses located in the
Chicago loop caused by a barge pile driver on the Chicago
River. In the process of removing old piles and installing new
ones, a tunnel was weakened, eventually collapsed, and caused
the flooding.1 0 The district court dismissed the suit for lack of
maritime jurisdiction, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, and the
Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit."8 '
The Court maintained that in spite of the various tests applied
by the lower courts, it would apply the two-prong test developed
in Executive Jet.1s2 Following Sisson, "a party seeking to involve
federal admiralty jurisdiction .. .must satisfy conditions both of
location and of connection to maritime activity."'1 3 The court
stated: "[a] court applying the location test must determine
whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury
suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water."'8 4
In turn, "[t]he connection test raises two issues. A court, first,
must 'assess the general features of the type of incident in-
volved,' . .. to determine whether the incident has 'a potentially
disruptive impact on maritime commerce,' . . . Second, a court
must determine whether 'the general character' of the 'activity
giving rise to the incident' shows a 'substantial relationship to
traditional maritime activity.' 185
The locality test was easily met since the Chicago River is navi-
gable. 1 6 The Grubart Court determined the "general features"
178 513 U.S. 527 (1995).
179 Id. at 532-33. The Court noted that Congress had modified the law with the
Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act to "gather the odd case into admiralty,"
but the trilogy decisions of the Court were "aimed at keeping a different class of
odd cases out." Id.
180 Id. at 530.
is' Id. at 531.
182 Id. at 534. In criticizing the factor tests applied by the lower courts, the
Supreme Court said that the review of the "general features" of the incident was a
more satisfactory method for applying the two-prong test. Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363-65 (1990)).
186 Sisson, 497 U.S. at 365.
310
ADMIRAL TYJURISDICTION
of the incident proved to be potentially disruptive to maritime
commerce because the damage to the tunnel and underground
structures could restrict the waterway from navigational use dur-
ing any repairs.'87 As to the connection prong, the Supreme
Court stated in Grubart: "[w] e held that 'claims arising from air-
plane accidents are not cognizable in admiralty' despite the lo-
cation of the harm, unless 'the wrong bear[s] a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity.' "188
Justice Thomas delivered a concurring opinion stating that he
"would restore the jurisdictional inquiry to the simple question
whether the tort occurred on a vessel on the navigable waters of
the United States. If so, then admiralty jurisdiction exists."'18 9 It
was his view that revisiting maritime jurisdiction for the third
time in ten years suggested problems with the Court's approach
and was causing too many difficulties in the lower courts. 90 Jus-
tice Thomas explained that the Court's extension of the Execu-
tive Jet aircraft rule to vessels and the further agreement by Sisson
"created ambiguity and uncertainty by creating levels of general-
ity required to determine maritime jurisdiction."' 9'
One addition to the maritime jurisdiction matrix was the
Court's finding that in cases involving multiple tortfeasors, "as
long as one of the putative tortfeasors was engaged in traditional
maritime activity the allegedly wrongful activity will 'involve'
such traditional maritime activity and will meet the second
nexus prong" of the test.'92 Thus, admiralty jurisdiction could
apply 93 and the non-maritime parties do not affect the jurisdic-
tional inquiry of the maritime party.194
Some have said that the reiteration of the admiralty jurisdic-
tional test established in the trilogy cases, and re-enforced by the
Grubart Court, has "prompted uniformity in the circuits, and
187 Grubert v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 539 (1995).
18 Id. at 533.
189 Id. at 549 (Thomas, J., concurring).
190 Id. Similar to Justice Scalia's opinion in Foremost, Justice Thomas would re-
turn to the simple reasoning of Executive Jet.
19, Id. at 551-54 (Thomas, J., concurring).
192 Id. at 541.
193 Id. Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, wished to clarify that the admi-
ralty jurisdiction once found over a particular party or claim did not require that
the court exercise admiralty jurisdiction over all claims and all parties involved in
the case. Id. at 548 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
194 Id.
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there does not appear to be any particular problem in applying
the Grubart test."'' 9
5
Land-based torts do not necessarily eliminate admiralty juris-
diction. If the nexus to traditional maritime activity can be
demonstrated in conjunction with the tort's operative effect on
navigable waters, jurisdiction may be possible.196 Contrast this
concept with an aviation tort falling within admiralty jurisdiction
where the accident occurred in airspace over high sea, but the
plane did not crash into the waters.
Thus, negligence, which may have occurred on land, does not
necessarily preclude admiralty jurisdiction. This is so because
the negligent act (or negligent failure to act) is only part of the
total picture. In determining where the "tort occurred," one
must also consider the effects of the negligence and where those
effects occurred. Indeed, in Executive Jet, the Supreme Court
stated, "[u]nder the locality test, the tort 'occurs' where the al-
leged negligence took effect . . ."197 Similarly, a district court
found admiralty jurisdiction in a case where a boat was stolen
from a marina and later set ablaze in the bay. 198 The court
found both the locality test and the substantial relationship test
were met. Thus, the court found admiralty jurisdiction, finding
the case similar to other cases in which product liability claims
were asserted against land-bound defendants who allegedly sup-
plied defective products that were installed in vessels and which
caused injury or damage while the vessels were on the high
seas. 1
99
195 See Dale Van Demark, Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company: A Rea-
sonable Conclusion to the Debate on Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction, 17 PACE L. REV. 553,
586 (1997); Major B. Harding, Judicial Decision-Making Analysis of Federalism Issues
in Modern United States Supreme Court Maritime Cases, 75 TUL. L. REv. 1517, 1547
(2001).
196 See Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171,
174 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The maritime nature of the tort is not necessarily adversely
affected by the fact that negligent construction or defective design . . . may have
occurred ashore."); Hibschman v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828, 841
(D.V.I. 1977) (The operating condition of the aircraft and the application of
strict liability were issues raised).
197 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 266 (1972).
198 Onebeacon Ins. Group v. Great Lakes Inn Mgmt., Inc., No. 01-C0969, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23077 (E.D. Wisc. 2002).
199 See Mink v. Genmar Indus., Inc., 29 F.3d 1543, 1546-47 (lth Cir. 1994)
(involving an injured passenger who claimed vessel was defectively designed for
not providing adequate handholds or seats); Hassinger v. Tideland Elec. Mem-
bership Corp., 781 F.2d 1022, 1024 (4th Cir. 1986) (defective mast); Sperry Rand
Corp. v. Radio Corp., 618 F.2d 319, 320 (5th Cir. 1980) (defective steering gyro);
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In assessing the substantial relationship test, the court stated:
To reiterate, "[t]he connection test raises two issues. A court,
first, must 'assess the general features of the type of incident in-
volved,' . . . to determine whether the incident has 'a potentially
disruptive impact on maritime commerce' . . . Second, a court
must determine whether 'the general character' of the 'activity
giving rise to the incident' shows a 'substantial relationship to
)traditional maritime activity.'"200
In addressing the first prong of the "maritime connection en-
quiries" a court is to ask "whether the incident could be seen
within a class of incidents that posed more than a fanciful risk to
commercial shipping . . The first prong goes to the potential
effects, not to the particular facts of the incident; that is to say, it
goes to whether the general features of the incident were likely
to disrupt commercial activity. The first Sisson test turns, then,
on a description of the incident at an intermediate level of possi-
ble generality. 2 1
IV. WARSAW CONVENTION IMPACT ON CLAIMS
For any aviation tort involving international air transporta-
tion,20 2 the discussion must include the impact of the Warsaw
Convention on claims, damages, and choice of law. The Warsaw
Convention, 2°' as modified by the Montreal Protocol No. 4,204
Jones v. Bender Welding & Mach. Works, 581 F.2d 1331, 1332 (9th Cir. 1978)
(defective design caused damage to fishing vessel).
200 See Onebeacon, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 23077, at *10-11. (citing Grubart, 513
U.S. at 534) (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363-65 (1990)).
201 Id. at *12 (quoting Grubert, 513 U.S. at 538-39) (citations omitted).
202 International travel, for the purposes of the Warsaw Convention, is deemed
to be travel from one signatory country to another. Even if one leg of the journey
at issue is completed within the territorial jurisdiction of one country, as long as
the beginning and end of the journey are in different signatory nations it will be
deemed an international flight. See 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (1996). See also Haldimann
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 168 F.3d 1324, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1999); In re Am. Airlines,
Inc. Flight 869 Turbulence Incident ofJan. 17, 1996, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D.
Fla. 2001).
203 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.X. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (West 2001) [hereinafter Warsaw Con-
vention]. Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention governs the liability of interna-
tional air carriers for accidents in which a passenger is wounded on an
international flight. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155,
162 (1999). Article 22 creates monetary liability limits on damage awards against
an international airline. Id. at 163 n.7. Recognizing that the liability limits of the
Warsaw Convention, signed in 1929 and amended in 1955, are now inadequate in
most countries, a group of international airlines, including American Airlines,
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provides the exclusive basis for filing personal injury suits
against air carriers in international air transportation between
High Contracting parties."' Airlines that are signatories to the
International Air Transportation Authority (JATA) Intercarrier
Agreement on Passenger Liability2"6 assume liability for an in-
jury caused by an accident within the meaning of the Warsaw
Convention unless the airline can prove that it took all necessary
measures to avoid the injury or accident.2 ° v
However, the Warsaw Convention does not allow all possible
claims against an air carrier. Often at issue, is the Convention's
prohibition against punitive damages and against emotional dis-
tress claims. Permissible claims under the Warsaw Convention
are then evaluated by the provisions of applicable state and fed-
eral law. The Supreme Court has essentially closed the door on
has taken action to waive the Convention's liability limits through a series of
agreements. See Lloyd v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 291 F.3d 503, 506 n.2 (8th Cir. 2002).
Among the agreements supplementing the Warsaw Convention is the Interna-
tional Air Transport Association Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability
(the IATA Intercarrier Agreement). With listed exceptions for certain routes,
the measures implementing the JATA Intercarrier Agreement impose absolute
liability on an international carrier to the extent of 100,000 Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs-a type of international monetary reserve currency or accounting
system created in 1968 by the International Monetary Fund, see International
Monetary Fund, at http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/:/intlmlone.asp (last
modified Jan. 28, 2003), which is a specialized agency of the United Nations that
determines the value of SDRs relative to the currencies of the five largest export-
ing nations. Current conversion rates place this amount at approximately
$134,453. For claims exceeding this amount, limited defenses are available to the
airlines under the Warsaw Convention, but in all cases in which a passenger has
been wounded in an accident, the IATA Intercarrier Agreement waives the War-
saw Convention's limitation of liability "on recoverable compensatory dam-
ages . . . so that recoverable compensatory damages may be determined and
awarded by reference to the law of the domicile of the passenger." The provi-
sions are implemented in the carrier's tariffs and the contract of carriage be-
tween the carrier and its passenger.
204 The United States ratified Protocol No. 4 November 5, 1998 and it went
into force March 4, 1999. See 144 CONG. REc. S11059-02 (Daily Ed. Sept. 28,
1998). A series of four protocols beginning with the Montreal Agreement in
1966 were the product of several delegate meetings. The United States has rati-
fied only the fourth protocol. Instrumental to the ratification was the addition of
the decedent's domicile as a venue to bring suit. Id.
205 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 170, 176 (1999) (finding
that the Warsaw Convention is the passengers' exclusive remedy against an inter-
national carrier); Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1281 (11th Cir.
1999).
206 El Al Israel Airlines, 525 U.S. at 172.
207 Cortes, 177 F.3d at 1281-82 n.5; In reAir Crash Off Point Mugu, California,
on Jan. 30, 2000, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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arguments against the exclusivity of the Warsaw Convention for
international carriers under the provisions of Articles 17, 18,
and 19,208 and their application through Article 25.2o9 However,
Article 25 actions require showing that the air carrier did not
take "all necessary measures" in order to break through the ex-
clusivity of remedies that limit liability of the air carrier. 21 0 Find-
ing that the air carrier did not take all necessary measures
negates the due care exclusion from liability contained in the
Convention.2 1 1 The Ninth Circuit used this analysis to find an
airline's employees were guilty of willful misconduct when an
asthmatic passenger suffered complications when he was ex-
posed to ambient second-hand smoke. 2  Evidence showed that
the passenger and his wife had repeatedly requested assistance
from the flight attendants with increasing urgency and were
denied. 3
The Supreme Court has said that the Warsaw Convention is
"nothing more than a pass through, authorizing [a court] to ap-
ply the law that would govern in the absence of the Warsaw Con-
vention. ' 21 4 However, most courts construe the pass-through
language as applying only to remedies21 5 and procedures
216
208 Article 17 establishes liability for death or bodily injury to a passenger, Arti-
cle 18 deals with liability of baggage and goods, and Article 19 deals with liability
due to delay. Warsaw Convention, supra note 205, 49 Stat. at 3019.
29 El Al Israel Airlines, 525 U.S. at 155. "Recourse to local law would under-
mine the uniform regulation of international air carrier liability that the Conven-
tion was designed to Foster." Id. at 169 (citing f7oyd, 872 F.2d at 1483, rev'd on
other grounds, 499 U.S. 530 (1991)). See also Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, 516
U.S. 217 (1996).
210 "[A] Ithough this issue has not been directly decided by the Supreme Court
or the Ninth Circuit, 'every court that has addressed this issue has held that the
liability and remedy contemplated by Article 17 of the Convention is compensa-
tory in nature and not punitive'..." (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster Near
Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia on Sept. 2, 1998, 210 F. Supp. 2d 570, 572 (3d Cir.
2002)). For cases discussing willful misconduct, see In re Air Crash at Taipei,
Taiwan, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (C.D. Calif. 2002); Laor v. Air France, 31 F. Supp.
2d 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);Jack v. Trans World Airlines, 854 F. Supp. 654, 663 (N.D.
Cal. 1994) (punitive damages not recoverable even if the air carrier engaged in
willful misconduct).
211 Montreal Protocol No. 4 revised the willful misconduct language to all nec-
essary measures. Some say this has made Article 25 easier to penetrate in wrong-
ful death claims.
212 Husain v. Olympic Airways, No. 00-14509, 2002 WL 3170414 (9th Cir. Feb.
12, 2002).
213 Id.
214 Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 229.
215 For a full discussion of the damages recoverable, particularly the unavaila-
bility of punitive damages, see In re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, California, on Jan.
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available where not preempted by the Warsaw Convention.
Thus, if a claim is permitted by the Convention, the analysis is
governed by the law of the forum, including the forum's choice
of law rules. 217 Note, as well, that the Warsaw Convention ap-
plies only to the air carrier. Thus, causes of action against a
manufacturer or other entity are not precluded or addressed by
the Warsaw Convention.
A. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The district court in In re Air Crash Off Point MugU,2 18 held that
the right to recover from the carrier, Alaska Airlines, fell under
the Warsaw Convention and therefore limited the recovery to
compensatory damages and excluded punitive damages. As an-
other district court stated, "the case law denying punitive dam-
ages in Warsaw Convention claims remains fundamentally
sound...,,2"0 These decisions are based on the Warsaw Conven-
tion's governance of claims between carriers and passengers.
Actions against third party tortfeasors are a separate issue, and
may allow non-aviation carriers to be sued for punitive damages.
Some have asserted that the Zickerman language establishing a
"pass-through" to local damages law did not bar any type of dam-
30, 2000, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (2001). The district court in Point Mugu has ar-
ticulated the most definitive position on this issue to date.
216 For a procedural discussion, see Hosaka v. United Airlines, 305 F.3d 989 (9th
Cir. 2002) (holding a forum non conveniens motion is unavailable under
Warsaw).
217 See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Fed. Express Corp., 189 F.3d 914, 919-20 (9th Cir.
1999).
218 45 F. Supp. at 1162 (citing In re Korean Airlines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983,
932 F.2d 1475, 1485-90 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991); In reAir
Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267, 1284 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 920 (1991); Floyd v. E. Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462,
1483 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 530, (1991); In reAir Crash
Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland on Dec. 12, 1985, 684 F. Supp. 927, 931 (W.D.
Ky. 1987); Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 14 (2d Cir. 1996);
Laor v. Air France, 31 F. Supp. 2d 347, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);Jack v. Trans World
Airlines, 854 F. Supp. 654, 663 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 634
F. Supp. 797, 799 (N.D. Ill. 1986); In reAir crash Disaster near Roselawn, Indiana
on Oct. 13, 1994, 960 F. Supp. 150, 153 (N.D. Ill. 1997)).
219 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana, 960 F. Supp. 150, 153
(N.D. Ill. 1997). "Far from rejecting the lower courts' conclusions that punitive
damages are unavailable under the Warsaw Convention, Zichernan actually sup-
ports that conclusion by discussing damages in Convention claims purely in terms
of compensatory damages." Id. at 152.
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ages and therefore allowed punitive damages. 220 The courts
have strongly rejected this argument. 22' As the Point Mugu
Court held: "[T]he Supreme Court's 'pass through' language
was discussing only those claims that were not otherwise barred
by the Warsaw convention, and that the Court did not mean to
overrule prohibitions established by the Convention. "222
B. Is IT AN ACCIDENT?
For a claim to fall within the confines of the Warsaw Conven-
tion there must be an accident. 221 Pursuant to Article 17, for a
carrier to be held liable to an injured passenger, the passenger
must prove that an accident caused the injury.224 The Supreme
Court stated: "An air carrier cannot be liable under [the Warsaw
Convention] when an accident has not caused a passenger to
suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of injury."
The Supreme Court has defined an accident to be "an unex-
pected or unusual event or happening that is external to the
passenger. '225 Determination of whether an accident has oc-
curred within the parameters of the Supreme Court's definition
is to be "flexibly applied after assessment of all the circum-
stances surrounding a passenger's injuries. "226 When there is
contradictory evidence, the trier of fact decides, and if the pas-
senger's injury "'indisputably results from the passenger's own
internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation
of the aircraft,' then it is not the result of an accident as envi-
sioned by Article 17."227 Currently, three areas of contested "in-
juries" appear to be getting the most attention: turbulence
injuries, blood clot injuries, and emotional distress injuries.
220 See In reAir Crash at Taipei, Tawain, on Oct. 31, 2000, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1069,
1071 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
221 Id. Read in its entirety, the Zicherman opinion clearly addresses the sole
question of whether the substantive rule for awarding compensatory damages
should be taken from French translations-the language in which the treaty was
written and from which the meaning of the term "damages" ("dommage" in
French) must be determined-or through application of local law, including the
forum's choice of law principles. Id. See also In Re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, 145
F. Supp. 2d at 1162.
222 In Re Air Crash Off Point Mugo, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1162. See also In Re Air
Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
223 See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985).
224 Id. at 405.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 See Husain v. Olympic Airways, No. 00-14509, 2002 WL 31770414, at *5 (9th
Cir. Feb. 12, 2002) (quoting Air France, 470 U.S. at 406).
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In Blansett v. Continental Airlines, Inc., a Texas court allowed a
claim by non-passengers to proceed for injuries to a passenger
who allegedly sustained a debilitating cerebral stroke that was
ostensibly caused by a blood clot that formed during a lengthy
flight.228 Turbulent injury claims have required a showing of
more than normal flight bumping.229 Turbulence encountered
in flight is not considered an accident unless the passenger can
establish it was "severe" or "extreme. 230
C. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The Warsaw Convention also precludes claims for emotional
distress.231 Claims that arise from physical injury which stem
from emotional distress are also prohibited by the Conven-
tion.232 Recent attempts to secure emotional distress damages
by some type of physical manifestation or injury to achieve re-
covery under Warsaw have garnered mixed results. 233 In Weaver
v. Delta Airlines, the plaintiff successfully claimed post-traumatic
228 Blansett v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (S.D. Tex.
2002). Blood clots in the lower extremities is a phenomenon typically referred to
as "economy class syndrome" or "deep venous thrombosis syndrome." Id.
229 See Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines, No. 02-1627, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22065
(D.C.N.J. 2002); Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd., 151 F.3d 108 (3d Cir.
1999).
230 See Magan v. Luftansa German Airlines, 181 F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2001).
231 E. Airlines Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991). See generally Kathryn A.
Meyers, Does a Claim for Decedents' Pre-Death Pain and Suffering in Actions Arising Out
of Aviation Disasters Governed by the Warsaw Convention and the Death on the High Seas
Act?: The Need for Legislative Reform, 75 WASH. U.L.Q. 1335 (1997).
232 See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 172 (1999).
233 See Jack v. Trans World Airlines, 854 F. Supp. 654, 667 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(holding that emotional distress is cognizable under the Warsaw Convention if
the emotional distress arises out of a physical injury). See also Saks v. Air France,
470 U.S. 392 (1985). "The text of Article 17 refers to an accident which caused
the passenger's injury, and not to an accident which is the passenger's injury." Id.
See also Bobian, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22065 (denying emotional distress claims
for PTSD when airplane flew through turbulence); Terraftanca, 151 F.3d at 108
(physical manifestation of fear or anxiety not recoverable under Warsaw); Tur-
turro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Plaintiff dis-
covered her anti-anxiety medicine was missing. Her fear of flying was such that
she called 911 and had the police ask the pilot to return to the gate. Port Author-
ity security boarded the plane and removed plaintiff from the plane as an "un-
ruly" passenger. She was placed in a psychiatric emergency room against her will.
Alleged injuries caused by her fear and subsequent removal from the plane was
preempted by Warsaw, however the court said the plaintiff could proceed on
claims regarding her treatment by security after she was removed from the plane
because those claims were not subject to Warsaw.).
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stress triggered by the "terror" of an emergency landing.23 4 Ex-
pert witnesses presented evidence that the terror impacted her
brain bio-chemically. 235 Note, however, the decision was later
vacated.236 Similarly, a plaintiff who received only minor inju-
ries as she escaped from an airplane that crashed in a storm was
allowed to recover all "damages sustained" at the district court
level.237 But upon review of the district court's award of $6.5
million, the Eighth Circuit followed what it termed the "more
mainstream view" and ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to
only emotional injury damages flowing from her personal inju-
ries. 238 The Eighth Circuit held that emotional damages flowing
directly from physical injuries caused by the accident should be
compensated, but physical manifestations of mental or emo-
tional injuries such as weight loss, inability to sleep, or physical
changes in the brain resulting from chronic post-traumatic
stress disorder were not compensable in a Warsaw claim.23 9
Most significantly, the Eighth Circuit stated that if the plaintiff
opted for a new trial over the remittur, the trial court must hold a
Daubert24 ° hearing on the expert testimony to examine the reli-
ability factors and analyze the expert's theories on the plaintiff's
allegations that actual brain injury was suffered from chronic
PTSD related to the air crash.
On the other hand, at least one court has been willing to
grant family members of crash victims recovery for mental dis-
tress prior to death.24 '
234 See Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Mont. 1999). The
district court distinguished this case from other emotional distress cases because
the plaintiff's claim was presented as a physical injury, relying on recent scientific
research explaining post-traumatic stress disorder causing trauma to brain cell
structures. Id. at 1192.
235 Id. at 1190-92. The Montana jury awarded $1.25 million.
236 Id. (pursuant to stipulation by parties).
237 See In reAir Crash at Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1, 1999, 118 F. Supp. 2d
916 (E.D. Ark. 2000). The airline opposed any recovery for emotional injuries
not directly related to her physical injuries.
238 See In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Arkansas, On June 1, 1999, 291 F.3d 503
(8th Cir. 2002). In reviewing the evidence, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that
Plaintiff Anna Lloyd suffered injuries to her legs and some smoke inhalation in
the crash that might have caused some of her emotional problems, but it deter-
mined that most of her mental injuries did not result directly from her physical
injuries. Id. at 508.
29 Id. at 509-10.
240 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
241 See In re Air Crash Near Roselawn, Indiana, On Oct. 31, 1994, 954 F. Supp.
175, 178-79 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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V. DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS
Enacted in 1920, the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA), was intended to provide relief from the Supreme
Court's very unpopular ruling in The Harrisburg.243 The passage
of DOHSA provided a cause of action to survivors of a decedent
whose death was "caused by wrongful act, neglect or default oc-
curring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore
of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or
dependencies of the United States. 2 4
A. WHAT CONSTITUTES HIGH SEAS?
The determination of high seas has changed since the statute
was originally written. DOHSA first applied to deaths occurring
beyond a marine league from shore.24' A marine league is ap-
proximately three nautical miles. President Reagan extended
the United States territorial waters in 1988 to twelve nautical
miles. 24 6 The 2000 amendments to DOHSA conform to federal
territorial waters, within twelve miles, DOHSA does not apply,
beyond twelve miles, DOHSA applies.
242 46 U.S.C. §§ 761- 67 (2001) [hereinafter DOHSA].
243 The Harrisburg v. Richards, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). In the spring of 1877, the
steamer, Harrisburg, collided with a schooner off the coast of Martha's Vineyard.
The First Officer of the schooner was killed and his family sought a wrongful
death action. The Court ruled that there was no remedy in federal common law
for death occurring on the high seas, and that admiralty law could not supply a
remedy. Id. See also Steven R. Pounian, TWA 800 and Death on the High Seas Act,
N.Y.LJ. at 3 (Aug. 29, 1997).
2-44 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67. Uniform and comprehensive legislation set forth pro-
visions for all actions involving deaths on the high seas, including:
§ 761-Established the cause of action and the designation of beneficiaries;
§ 762-Restricts the recoverable damages to the "pecuniary loss" sustained by the
designated beneficiaries;
§ 763-Provides a two year limitation (Since changed to 3 years with the enact-
ment of the Uniform Statute of Limitation for Maritime Torts, 46 U.S.C. § 763a
(1980);
§ 764-Preserves rights under foreign law, where applicable;
§ 765-Permits the continuance of a claim if a victim files the action under
DOHSA and dies while the claim is still pending;
§ 766-Provides that contributory negligence of the decedent will not bar a recov-
ery; and
§ 767-Allows concurrent jurisdiction in state courts and the preservation of state
law in territorial waters.
245 46 U.S.C. § 761.
246 Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988).
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B. APPLICATION OF DOHSA TO AVIATION CASES
Application of DOHSA to aviation cases began in 1941 with
Choy v. Pan American Airways. 24 7 The Supreme Court recognized
that if an aircraft accident satisfied the requirements of § 761,
then DOHSA would apply to any action brought as a result of
the accident.248 The language is broad and has been found to
apply to any accident occurring on the high seas which results in
death, including actions involving air carriers,249 aviation prod-
uct manufacturers, 250 and aircraft maintenance facilities.25' In
Executive Jet, the Supreme Court recognized the applicability of
DOHSA to aircraft accidents by stating:
Since Choy, many actions for wrongful death arising out of air-
craft crashes into the high seas beyond one marine league from
shore have been brought under the Death on the High Seas Act,
and federal jurisdiction has consistently been sustained in those
cases. Indeed, it may be considered as settled that [DOHSA]
gives the federal admiralty courts jurisdiction of such wrongful-
death actions. 25
2
In Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, the Supreme Court reversed
the Fifth Circuit and ruled that DOHSA preempted state law.
"[W] here Congress had spoken, or where general federal mari-
time law controlled, the states exercising concurrentjurisdiction
over maritime matters could not apply conflicting state substan-
tive law."253
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines,254 serves as a strong example for
the application of DOHSA to aviation cases. In the 1983 Korean
Air Line disaster, the Supreme Court ruled that the case fell
within the "literal terms" of DOHSA and that "it is well estab-
lished that those literal terms apply to airplane crashes. '255 In
Zicherman, an international flight was shot down and crashed
into the high seas, causing the death of all aboard. 256 The Court
held that DOHSA was the applicable law on damages for inter-
247 See Batkiewicz v. Seas Shipping Co., 53 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)
(citing the previous unpublished decision in Choy v. Pan Am. Airways).
248 See Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 212-15 (1986); Miles v.
Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 22-24 (1990).
249 See Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 212-15; Miles, 498 U.S. at 22-24.
250 See Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 212-15; Miles, 498 U.S. at 22-24.
251 See Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 212-15; Miles, 498 U.S. at 22-24.
252 Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 263-64.
253 See Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 228.
254 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
255 Id.
256 Id. at 219.
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national flights governed by the Warsaw Convention,257 making
DOHSA the exclusive source of recovery for wrongful death
damages.258
DOHSA creates a wrongful death action that compensates
designated beneficiaries for losses sustained as the result of the
decedent's death. 259 Survivor actions, which allow the continua-
tion of an action by decedent for personal injuries prior to
death, are not permitted.26 °
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Dooley v. Korean Air
Lines, Co., 2 6 1 to resolve a conflict among the circuits.262 The
Court followed its earlier decisions in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v.
Tallentir2 63 and Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,264 holding that
congressional designation of potential claimants and recover-
able damages under DOHSA was clear, and neither decedent
estates as claimants in a survival action, nor non-pecuniary dam-
ages were permitted.265
257 Id. at 218-19.
258 Id. See alsoJadJ. Stepp & MichaelJ. AuBuchon, Flying Over Troubled Waters:
The Collapse of DOHSA s Historic Application to Litigation Arising from High Seas Com-
mercial Airline Accidents, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 805, 842 (2000) ("For cases arising
under [DOHSA] jurisdiction is guaranteed 'in admiralty' [and] the law is well-
settled that, in all admiralty cases, the applicable substantive law is general mari-
time law."); Jimmy Wilkens, Application of Admiralty Jurisdiction to Aviation Disaster
on the High Seas, 20 MAR. L.J. 465 (1996); William C. Brown, III, Problems Arising
from the Intersection of Traditional Maritime Law and Aviation Death and Personal In-
jury Liability, 68 TUL. L. REv. 577 (1994).
259 A personal representative of the decedent must initiate the action, and the
action must exclusively benefit the decedent's spouse, parent, child or depen-
dent relative. A dependent relative is one who is financially dependent on the
decedent at the time of his/her death. Future promise of support is not enough,
neither is emotional dependence. See Oldham v. Korean Air lines, 127 F.3d 43
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 43 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1994), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996); Evich v. Connelly, 759 F.2d 1432
(9th Cir. 1985); 46 U.S.C. § 761 (2001). See also Kole v. Korean Air Lines, 92 F.3d
1192 (9th Cir. 1996); Adcabasa v. Korean Air Lines, 62 F.3d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Cruz v. Korean Air Lines, 838 F. Supp. 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
260 See Dooley v. Korean Airlines, 524 U.S. 116 (1998).
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 See Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 218.
264 See Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973),
aff d in part, 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618
(1978).
265 See Dooley, 524 U.S. at 116. See also Hugh R. Koss & Michael L. Rodenbaugh,
Recent Developments in Aviation Law, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 3 (1999).
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C. DAMAGES UNDER DOHSA
1. Pecuniary
Recovery for pecuniary losses 266 under DOHSA has been held
to include damages for loss of support and maintenance, 26 7 loss
of services, loss of parental nurture, loss of inheritance, and fu-
neral or burial expenses.
2. Non-Pecuniary
The Supreme Court has interpreted DOHSA to preclude the
recovery of non-pecuniary damages, whether based on state
law 268 or general maritime law. 269 In a state action, awarding
non-pecuniary damages can be significant. Key elements of
such claims including loss of society, survivor's grief, and pre-
death pain and suffering. Loss of society encompasses a wide
variety of mutual benefits family members receive from each
other such as love, attention, companionship, and protection.
According to the Zicherman Court, DOHSA precludes loss of
society damages. 270 The negative impact of grief upon the survi-
vors is also not recoverable.27 1 In this area, DOHSA follows most
states in denying recovery to survivors for mental anguish, grief
and sorrow.
3. Pre-Death Pain and Suffering
Prior to the Supreme Court cases in Dooley and Zicherman, the
lower courts generally allowed DOHSA to be supplemented with
a survival action for non-pecuniary pre-death pain and suffering
damages. 27 2 A California district court stated the typical applica-
tion of a lower court decision: "The Court... has expressly re-
served decision on whether a survival action brought by the
266 46 U.S.C. § 762. The recovery in suit shall be a fair and just compensation
for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is
brought and shall be apportioned among them by the court in proportion to the
loss they may severally have suffered by reason of the death of the person by
whose representative the suit is brought. Id.
267 DOHSA restricts damages to the support and maintenance a claimant
would have received if the decedent had lived. DOHSA does not allow recovery
for lost or future earnings. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 23-36
(1990).
268 See Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 218.
269 See Higginbotham, 357 F. Supp. at 1164.
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decedent's estate and seeking non-pecuniary damages could be
permitted where DOHSA applies. ' 273 Claims were permitted on
the basis of the Warsaw Convention, general maritime law and
state law.274 It should be noted the Hawaii accident was con-
strued as a DOHSA claim, even though the aircraft was able to
land following the mid-air accident over international water.275
The Zickerman decision appeared to remove the availability of
non-pecuniary damages, including survivor's grief, and pre-
death pain and suffering. 2 6 Doubts were removed with the Su-
preme Court's conclusions in Dooley v. Korean Air Lines.277
In previous decisions, courts had decided that since DOHSA
only specifically addressed wrongful death actions, it was up to
the courts to fill the void created by Congress. In Dooley, how-
ever, the Court determined that Congress intended to withhold
survival remedies by only permitting pecuniary damages. 27" By
inference, the Court determined that Congress had "chosen to
adopt a more limited survival provision,' 279 otherwise, those
seeking to recover non-pecuniary damages for pre-death pain
and suffering would illegally enlarge the class of beneficiaries
and recoverable damages specifically limited by the provisions of
DOHSA. 210 The Court was further persuaded by comparing the
provisions of DOHSA with other federal maritime remedies,
273 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii, on Feb. 24, 1989, 792 F.
Supp. 1541, 1545 (N.D. Cal. 1990). See also Bowden v. Korean Air Lines, 814 F.
Supp. 592, 598 (E.D. Mich. 1993), rev'd sub nom, Bickel v. Korean Air Lines, 83
F.3d 127, 132 (6th Cir.), amended on reh'g, 96 F. 3d 151 (6th Cir. 1996); In re In-
flight Explosion on TWA Aircraft Approaching Athens, Greece on Apr. 2, 1986,
778 F. Supp. 625, 637 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Ospina v.
TWA, 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992).
274 See Azzopardi v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 742 F.2d 890, 893 (5th
Cir. 1984); Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794, 799 (1st Cir. 1974); Dugas v. Nat'l
Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386, 1389 (3d Cir. 1971).
275 See In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Honolulu, 792 F. Supp. at 1544.
276 See Dooley v. Korean Airlines, 524 U.S. 116 (1998); Saavedra v. Korean Air
Lines, 93 F.3d 547, 549-51 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing Zicherman in Circuit Court
of Appeals decisions).
277 524 U.S. 116 (1998).
278 DOHSA expresses Congress' judgment that there should be no [survival]
cause of action in cases of death on the high seas. By authorizing only certain
surviving relatives to recover damages, and by limiting damages to the pecuniary
losses sustained by those relatives, Congress provided the exclusive recovery for





such as the Jones Act 28 I and the Federal Employers' Liability
Act,28 2 which specifically provide a survival cause of action. The
Court conclusively foreclosed the non-recovery of pre-death
pain and suffering damages governed by DOHSA, reasoning
that "we will not upset the balance struck by Congress by author-
izing a cause of action with which Congress was certainly famil-
iar but nonetheless declined to adopt. "283
4. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are not available in an action governed by
DOHSA. In addition, most DOHSA actions are impacted by the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention which specifically prohib-
its punitive damages.284
D. DOHSA CHANGES IN 2000
Following several air crashes, particularly the TWA 800 crash
in 1996 off the coast of New York, 2 5 political pressure was ex-
erted on Congress to make changes to DOHSA.
216 Attached to a
comprehensive aviation reform measure,
28 7 amendments to
DOHSA became effective April 5, 2000, but the remedies were
extended retroactively to one day prior to the crash of TWA
flight 800 to allow application of the new provisions to those
litigants. 2
88
New provisions mean that DOHSA no longer applies to a
wrongful death act that occurs on the high seas within twelve
28, 46 U.S.C. § 688, at app. (2001). The Jones Act was enacted the same year as
DOHSA, and actually provides the survival cause of action through incorporation
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
282 45 U.S.C. § 51, at app. (2001).
283 Dooley, 524 U.S. at 124.
284 See Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir. 1987); In re
Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii, 792 F. Supp. 1541, 154546 (N.D. Cal. 1990); In
re Korean Air Lines Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, on Dec. 21, 1988, 
928 F.2d
1267, 1284 (2d Cir. 1991); Floyd v. E. Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1483 (11th
Cir. 1989), rev'd in part on other grounds sub. nom., E. Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530
(1991).
285 In re Air Crash off Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200
(2000).
286 See generally Stepp & Au Buehon, supra note 261.
287 See Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment Reform Act for the 21st Century
("AIR 21"), Pub. L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.
app. § 761 (2001)).
288 Other cases that may have been assisted by the changes were Egypt Air
flight 990 and Swiss Air I 11.
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nautical miles of the United States shoreline. 28 9 But beyond
twelve nautical miles, where DOHSA applies, non-pecuniary
damages are now recoverable. 29 0 These amendments only apply
to commercial aviation accidents. Inside the territorial sea, the
amendment provides "the rules applicable under federal, state
and other appropriate law shall apply," but only involving com-
mercial aviation cases.29 1
Following the crash of a helicopter into a fixed oil rig plat-
form, the plaintiffs in Brown v. Euorocopter S.A.,2 92 first sought
recovery under state law as made applicable by the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).293 The court ruled DOHSA
applied, and thus non-pecuniary damages were not available.294
The plaintiffs then sought remedy under the amended version
of DOHSA. The court found that the helicopter accident fell
within the "commercial aviation accident" provision and held
that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover non-pecuniary dam-
ages for loss of care, comfort, and companionship.29 5
289 "AIR 21" amends DOHSA:
1. Within 12 Miles: DOHSA does not apply to a commercial avia-
tion accident occurring on the high seas 12 nautical miles or
closer to the shore of the United States. In those instances, the
rules applicable under Federal, State, and other appropriate law
shall apply.
2. Beyond 12 Miles: DOHSA applies to a commercial aviation acci-
dent occurring on the high seas beyond 12 nautical miles from
the shore of the United States but:
a. additional compensation for non-pecuniary damages (de-
fined as compensation for loss of decedent's care, comfort,
and companionship) is recoverable.
b. Punitive damages are expressly made not recoverable.
3. Effective date: The amendment shall apply to any death occur-
ring afterJuly 16, 1996.
Id. (This is the day before TWA 800 crashed off the coast of Long Island.)
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 111 F. Supp. 2d 859 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
293 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (2001). OCSLA most frequently appears in the context of
helicopter accidents on oil drilling platforms. "Federal law controls but the law
of the adjacent State is adopted as surrogate federal law to the extent that it is not
inconsistent with applicable federal laws and regulations." Offshore Logistics,
Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 217 (1986). The platforms, as covered by OG
SLA, are treated as if they were islands, or "federal enclaves within a landlocked
state." Id.
294 Brown, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 863.
295 Id. at 864.
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E. TERRITORIAL WATERS OF A FOREIGN STATE
In addition, applicability of DOHSA to foreign territorial wa-
ters has been an issue. Courts have generally held that if the
accident occurs beyond the territorial waters of the United
States, then "high seas" is relevant, even when the incident oc-
curs in the territorial waters of a foreign nation.296 Most would
argue that since the Supreme Court's decision in Zicherman,
there is no doubt when a plane crashes in the high seas causing
death, DOHSA will default to the applicable law of the United
States, and not foreign law.297 However, such cases are fre-
quently the subject of forum non conveniens issues.29 8
VI. MARITIME LAW APPLICATION-MORAGNE
WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS
A. RECOGNIZING WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
In Moragne v. State Lines Marine Lines, Inc.,299 the widow of a
longshoreman brought suit against a vessel owner to recover for
wrongful death, basing one claim on negligence, and a second
claim in admiralty on the unseaworthiness of the vessel.3"' Lia-
bility could not be found on the negligence claim on the basis of
state law. 1 However, the Court did find that an action for
wrongful death in territorial waters was subject to admiralty ju-
risdiction.3 °2 Overruling The Harrisburg,°3 the Court declared a
new rule of maritime law, holding "that an action does lie under
general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime
duties."30 4 The boundaries of the wrongful death action were
not defined. Instead, it took four subsequent Supreme Court
decisions to determine the parameters. In Sea-Land Services, Inc.
v. Gaudet,305 the Court decided that damages for loss of society
are available in general maritime wrongful death actions. 0 6 A
296 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, India, 531 F. Supp. 1175, 1182
(W.D. Wash. 1982).
297 See Zickerman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217, 224 (1996).
298 See In reAir Crash in Bali, Indonesia on Apr. 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th
Cir. 1982).
299 398 U.S. 375, 387-402 (1970).
300 Id. at 375-76.
301 Id. at 376.
302 Id. at 409.
303 119 U.S. 199 (1886). Relief was not provided for wrongful death.
304 Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409.
305 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
3406 Id. at 575.
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Moragne action is independent of any action the decedent may
have for his personal injuries. °7 But damages for loss of society
in actions resulting from death on the high seas were not al-
lowed in Mobil Oil Corp, v. Higginbotham.30 s Non-pecuniary dam-
ages, which are available under state law, are not allowed in
wrongful death actions that are heard under the auspices of
DOHSA, according to Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire.3 °9 In
the fourth case, Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,2 ° the Court deter-
mined that the Jones Act,31' which provides pecuniary damages,
is the exclusive remedy for Jones Act "seaman," even if the claim
is based upon a general maritime action.
B. WRONGFUL DEATH EXTENDED BEYOND UNSEAWORTHINESS
The wrongful death action may be based upon either negli-
gence or strict liability principles. 12 The general maritime
cause of action recognized in Moragne was based on the duty of
seaworthiness. 13 Recently, the Supreme Court, in Norfolk Ship-
building & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, confirmed that Moragne
wrongful death actions could be equally available for negli-
1414gence.  With reference to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Yamaha, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court stated:
As we have noted in an earlier opinion, the wrongful death rule
of Moragne was not limited to any particular duty, but Moragne's
facts were limited to the duty of seaworthiness, and so the issue of
wrongful death for negligence has remained technically open.
307 Id. at 578.
308 Id.
309 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
310 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
31, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (2001). The Jones Act is fundamentally a claim of
seaworthiness that has been applied to matters involving general maritime law.
312 See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§ 6-
32, at 368 (2d ed. 1975) (indicating a strong belief that the general maritime
wrongful death action created by Moragne provides recovery for negligence as
well as unseaworthiness). See Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir.
1980); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc., v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129,
1135 (9th Cir. 1977).
313 Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409.
314 532 U.S. 811 (2001). It is interesting to note that in the underlying appel-
late action of the Fourth Circuit, the panel was split on the application of
Moragne. Senior Judge Hall, writing for the majority, noted that if the Moragne
Court had meant to confine its holding to the seaworthiness issue it would have
distinguished The Harrisburg, rather than overruling it. Further, the Fourth Cir-
cuit interpreted the Supreme Court's Yamaha decision to "embrace" negligence
as a remedy allowed by Moragne. Id.
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We are able to find no rational basis, however, for distinguishing
negligence from seaworthiness.315
The Court also looked to the uniformity principle decided in
Moragne, and concluded that it was "centered on the extension
of relief," '316 rather than "on the contraction of remedies. '1 7
Thus, the courts articulated a broad relief for torts committed in
navigable waterways, and left the door open to bring general
negligence claims for wrongful death in a general maritime
wrongful death action.
C. DAMAGES AVAILABLE IN A MORAGNE WRONGFUL
DEATH CLAIM
Damages available under a Moragne wrongful death claim in-
clude both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.
1. Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary
Both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages are available in
Moragne wrongful death claims.""8 However, claims that are also
subject to either DOHSA or the Warsaw Convention must be
scrutinized to determine how the various provisions inter-
play3 19
2. Punitive Damages
Courts have not addressed whether punitive damages are
available in a non-seafarer Moragne action.3 20 There is, however,
a long history of punitive damages in admiralty cases.3 2' Puni-
tive damages are available in a survivor action in jurisdictions
that allow such claims. 22 Note, since most maritime cases in-
volve commercial air carriers, the provisions of the Warsaw Con-
315 Id. at 814 (noting Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199,
214 n.11 (1996) (dictum)).
316 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. at 213.
317 Id. The Court supported its conclusion with previous decisions allowing
remedies available to longshore and harbor workers where federal law remedies
were also available. Id. at 214-15.
318 Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409.
319 See supra Part III and Part V for discussion of these doctrines.
320 See In re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1166 (N.D. Cal
2001).
321 See BENEDICT ON ADMIRAL'Iy, supra note 11, § 5.04[D]; SCHOENBAUM, supra
note 12, §§ 5-17.
322 Id.
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vention will preclude punitive damage awards when the
Convention is applicable. 23
3. Survivor Actions
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dooley,324 survival re-
coveries were allowed under general maritime law. With the de-
cision in Dooley, the Supreme Court stated that DOHSA does not
include a survival remedy, and general maritime law will not al-
low for recovery of loss of society-except in state waters. 25 One
should note that Justice Thomas may have opened a door by
stating that "[a] ccordingly, we need not decide whether general
maritime law ever provides a survival action. ' 326 Dooley also indi-
cates that general maritime law will not allow recovery for loss of
society, except in state waters. 27
The Court allowed survival recoveries in Miles v. Apex Marine
Corp.3 28 The Jones Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act
specifically allow recovery for losses suffered during a decedent's
lifetime. 329 The Court would not allow recovery for future lost
earnings, although some state statutes would allow this remedy
in their survival statutes. 33 ° Following Apex, the court in In re Air
Crash Disaster Near Honolulu, allowed a survival action based
upon the "internal laws" of the United States in conjunction
with the "survival" component of the Warsaw Convention. 3
Pre-death pain and suffering is an element in most states' sur-
vival statutes.33 2 Some circuits recognize a survivor action under
general maritime law. For example, the Ninth Circuit recog-
nizes the right of a victim's estate to recover damages for his
personal injuries prior to death. 3  Since the Ninth Circuit rec-
323 See supra Part VI.
324 524 U.S. 116 (1998).
325 Id. at 123.
326 Id. at 124 n.2.
327 Id. at 125.
328 498 U.S. 19 (1990). This case involved ajones Act unseaworthiness claim,
available only to crew members.
329 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2001); 45 U.S.C. § 59 (2001).
330 Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. at 19.
33, 783 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (1992).
332 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 924, 926; KEETON, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS § 126.
33 See Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903, 919 (9th Cir. 1994); Evich v. Connelly, 759
F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1985). Damages available may include pre-death pain
and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of future wages. Id. See also Evich v.
Connelly, 819 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Evich II]. Punitive dam-
ages are also permitted in a survivor action.
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ognizes survival actions, the plaintiffs in In re Air Crash Off Point
Mugu, will be able to seek punitive damages against the plane's
manufacturer.334
4. Application of Maritime to Crew Members
As with other personal injury tort claims, damages recoverable
for a wrongful death depend upon the status of the deceased,
and whether the suit is brought against an employer or non-
employer. 35 If admiralty law is applied to an aviation incident,
deceased crew member-employees can receive compensation
through the applicable state workers' compensation law or
under general maritime principles. 6 Determination of when
crew members may receive state workers' compensation reme-
dies or may seek maritime law remedies depends upon the fo-
rum state of the employee and its workers' compensation
laws. 3 3
7
334 See In Re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1162. The court also
said that plaintiffs can bring wrongful death and survival actions against the air-
line and the manufacturer. Id. Damages may include compensation for the pas-
sengers' and crew members' pain before death and loss of their future wages. Id.
These damages might not have been available under Alaska state law.
335 For the wrongful death of seaman when the action is against the seaman's
employer, the Jones Act is applicable. On the other hand, if the action is against
a non-employer, then at high seas, DOHSA is applicable, but similar to aviation
accidents, the courts are split on recovery for deaths in state territorial waters or
the area in between. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 232
(1986). Court in Louisiana and California disallowed non-pecuniary losses based
on Offshore. See Trident Marine, Inc. v. M/V Atticos, 876 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. La.
1994); Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 426 (9th
Cir. 1994). But see Gerdes v. G & H Towing Co., 967 F. Supp. 943, 945 (S.D. Tex.
1997) (allowing non-pecuniary damages to a seaman, and criticizing other courts
for seeking uniformity under the premise of general maritime law, ad depriving
seaman of full available compensation). See also In re Denet Towing Serv., Inc.,
No.Civ.A. 98-1523, 1999 WL 329698, at *6 (E.D. La. May 21, 1999) (refusing to
deprive plaintiff of full damages). Wrongful death of longshoreman or harbor
workers during employment falls under the auspices of LHWCA. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-950 (2001). If death occurs on the high seas, DOHSA provides the exclu-
sive remedy whether against an employer or non employer under the LHWCA.
33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (2001). However, a death occurring in state waters finds the
LHWCA silent on damages and the courts have allowed non-pecuniary damages,
including loss of society. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
336 See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 356 (1995); see also Flying Boat,
Inc. v. Alberto, 723 So.2d 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that the Warsaw
Convention preempts state workers' compensation statute).
337 See Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1402 (9th Cir. 1994). The
Ninth Circuit allowed an employee of the state of Washington to invoke a negli-
gence claim under admiralty law against his employer because the state's law spe-
cifically excluded maritime actions from its workers' compensation exclusivity
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
VII. CONSEQUENCES OF MARITIME LAW
APPLICATION-BETWEEN THE BEACH AND 12
NAUTICAL MILES
"[0] nce admiralty is established, then all of the substantive
rules and precepts peculiar to the law of the sea become applica-
ble. 3 8 Exclusive jurisdiction is granted to federal courts, sitting
as admiralty courts, to determine substantive and procedural ad-
miralty law, to exercise and enforce admiralty remedies, and to
declare admiralty law. 9 Concurrent jurisdiction exists between
the state courts and federal courts, sitting as law courts, to hear
in personam claims for damages arising out of admiralty torts. 4 °
Once it is determined that a tort is by its nature, maritime, then
maritime law applies. However, a state-based claim is permitted
in a maritime case as longs as:
(1) It will not contravene an essential purpose of a congres-
sional act governing maritime law, or work a material prejudice
to the general maritime law, or interfere with the harmony and
uniformity of the general maritime law in its international and
interstate relations, 341' and either
(2) fulfills a state's significant and pressing interest in a mat-
ter,34 2 or
(3) fills a void in the general maritime law by serving its hu-
mane and liberal character of providing remedies to those in-
jured or killed by the perils of the sea.343
provision. See also Green v. Vermillion Corp., 144 F.3d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 1998),
where the Fifth Circuit ruled that Louisiana's exclusive remedy proscribed in the
Logician Workers' Compensation scheme was overridden by federal maritime
law. Id. at 335 (citing King v. Universal Elec. Const. Corp., 799 F.2d 1073, 1074
(5th Cir. 1986)). But see Brockington v. Certified, 903 F.2d 1523, 1533 (11th Cir.
1990) (holding that in the absence of an exclusivity provision, an employee was
prevented from making a maritime claim by the state workers' compensation
law).
338 In re Dearborn Marine Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 277 n.27 (5th Cir. 1974).
339 See 2-14 AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw § 14.01 (Bender 2001).
340 Id.
341 Id.
342 See Comind, Compannia de Seguros v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 116 F.R.D. 397,
426-28 (D. Conn. 1987).
343 See AVIAnON ACCIDENT LAw, supra note 342, § 14.01 (citing Moragne v.
United States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 475, 387-402 (1970)); In re S/S Helena
v. United States, 529 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1976).
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A. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION DOES NOT NECESSARILY PREEMPT
STATE LAW
In the landmark decision of Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Cal-
houn 44 the Supreme Court ruled that the federal maritime
wrongful death action recognized in Morag-ne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc.,345 did not preempt application of state wrongful
death statutes.3 46 In Calhoun, a twelve-year-old was on a vacation
with her family at a Puerto Rico resort hotel. She rented a jet
ski, and while operating the jet ski, she collided with a vessel
anchored in the waters near the hotel. 34" Her parents sued
Yamaha alleging defective design and manufacture in the U.S.
District court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based
upon Pennsylvania's wrongful death and survivor statutes.
Yamaha claimed that the federal wrongful death action an-
nounced in Moragne provided the exclusive source of recovery,
and precluded state law remedy. 4
The Court asserted that Moragne's wrongful-death action ex-
tended to nonseafarers. 349 It concluded with recognition of its
previous deference to Congress when Congress had enacted
comprehensive tort remedies.350 However, the Court noted that
Congress had not chosen to act in prescribing remedies for
wrongful deaths of nonseafarers in territorial waters. Thus, the
Court chose to preserve the application of state statutes to
deaths occurring in territorial waters. 5'
The Calhoun decision carefully examined the Moragne out-
come in an effort to demonstrate the narrow holding pursuant
to the facts in Moragne. The Moragne Court sought to gain uni-
formity of law in the specific parameters of availability of unsea-
344 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
345 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
346 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. at 202.
347 Id.
348 Id. at 203. Yamaha contended that the Calhouns could only recover funeral
expenses as pecuniary damages if federal maritime law applied. The district
court found for Yamaha under the maritime death claim, however the court held
that loss of society and loss of support and services were compensable under
Moragne. Id.
349 Id. at 625 n.7.
350 See Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. at 216 (citing Offshore Logistics v. Tallen-
tire, 477 U.S. 207, 212-15 (1986)); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 22-24
(1990) (noting that 46 U.S.C. § 767 of the Death on the High Seas Act specifi-
cally precluded the displacement of state law in territorial water).
351 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. at 216.
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worthiness as a remedy. 52 The uniformity that was sought in
Moragne was "centered on the extension of relief, not on the
contraction of remedies. '353 Adopting the Third Circuit's analy-
sis that Moragne "showed no hostility to concurrent application
of state wrongful death statutes," the Court held that general
maritime and state wrongful death remedies can operate con-
currently in cases involving nonseafarers' deaths in territorial
waters. 54 The Court returned to the expansive relief doctrines
of early admiralty cases and recalled that "it better becomes the
humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to
give than withhold the remedy, when not required to withhold it
by established and inflexible rules. '3 55 Since general maritime
law provided the remedy, rather than Congress, the court found
no bar to applying state law.356 The Court did not address the
question of whether federal or state substantive law governed
liability and ruled only on the issue of damages.3 5 ' The court
also did not discuss the ultimate forum decision-whether Penn-
sylvania or Puerto Rico law should apply.3 58
B. WHEN STATE AND ADMIRALTY FORUMS ARE
CONCURRENT-PLAINTIFF MAY CHOOSE
"The implication of Yamaha is that plaintiffs may choose a
state remedy, but they are also free to choose a federal
one . . ."351 In Yamaha, the plaintiffs sought a state remedy,
rather than maritime, but the plaintiffs sought the opposite rem-
edy in In re Air Crash Off Point Mugu. The defendant airline
sought to preclude admiralty jurisdiction, and invoke the choice
of law of the decedents' or defendants' domiciles, by unsuccess-
fully analogizing the case to Executive Jet.36 ° Plaintiffs sought
352 Id. at 211. Survivors of longshoremen who were killed in territorial waters
could recover under the seaworthiness theory, but survivors of similarly situated
seamen could not.
353 Id. at 213.
154 Id. at 214.
355 Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc. 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970) (quoting The
Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C. Md. 1985)).
356 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. at 216.
357 Id.
358 Id. Much was at stake. On remand, the district court and Third Circuit
decided that the law of the state of domicile, Pennsylvania, should cover the com-
pensatory damages, while the punitive damages would be decided by Puerto Rico
law. Yamaha Motor Corp., 216 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2000).
359 In re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, California, on Jan. 30, 2000, 145 F. Supp.
2d 1156, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
360 Id. at 1163.
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maritime law.361' The crash was an international flight, originat-
ing in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico with a scheduled landing in San
Francisco and ultimate destination of Seattle. The plane
crashed into California waters (and probably within the 12 miles
of federal territorial waters), thus admiralty law applied. 62 The
court focused on the "but for" analysis of other maritime cases
finding that "but for aviation, the journey would have been con-
ducted by sea.''363 Once admiralty applies, the consequences fol-
low. Therefore, the court determined that the punitive
damages sought by the plaintiffs were precluded by the Warsaw
Convention. However, maritime law recognized both wrongful
death actions and survival actions. The Ninth Circuit has a his-
tory of recognizing survival actions, but not compensating for
survivors' grief.364
In applying maritime law, the court listed a number of ramifi-
cations. First, maritime law would allow both pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damages. Economic damages could include loss
of wages, future loss of earning capacity, medical expenses, loss
of support, loss of services, and funeral expenses. Non-eco-
nomic damages include loss of consortium and loss of society
for the decedents' beneficiaries. 3 65 Second, deceased employees
could recover against the airlines under workers' compensation
law or general maritime tort principles.366 Third, application of
maritime law gave uniformity in recovery to all the claims, and
noted that relative uniformity was not the reason for the court's
decision, but a consequence of it. 36 7 Finally, the court addressed
the "fortuosity" argument by finding that the importance of the
location of the crash should not be determinative of the law to
be applied. So long as the crash occurred in navigable waters,
but fell short of the jurisdiction of DOHSA, then maritime law
was the proper law to apply.3 6
8
361 Id.
362 Id. The parties stipulated that DOHSA did not apply since the location was
not in high seas-beyond a marine league.
363 Id. at 1165 (citing Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 207).
364 Id. at 1166.
365 Id. The court noted survival damages would be available to the decedents'
estates to prosecute a negligence or strict liability claim that could include pre-
death pain, suffering, and emotional distress, and loss of future wages, but would
be precluded by Warsaw.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
As one court has noted, the advantage of the application of
maritime law to aviation accidents is that "all claims will be sub-
ject to one body of law, except as governed by the Warsaw Con-
vention or workmen's compensation. 369  Uniformity of law
saves the courts and the parties both time and expense. 70
Courts will be spared the task of applying choice of law rules as
they examine the numerous jurisdictions that may have a rela-
tionship with the aviation incident, and of ascertaining the ap-
propriate substantive law.37'
As applied in In re Air Crash Off Point Mugu,3 72 once maritime
jurisdiction is ascertained, the "pass through" doctrine of
Zicherman17 3 can be utilized to simplify the damage law when
passengers who die come from many different domiciles.
Rather than mandate the application of state law exclusively for
deaths in territorial waters, Yamaha expanded wrongful death
remedies in maritime cases. 374 General maritime law can be ap-
plied in addition to, or in substitution of state remedies. Once
Moragne and its progeny Gaudet are asserted, compensatory dam-
ages are allowable, as are non-pecuniary damages of loss of ser-
vices, loss of society and funeral expenses. General maritime law
allows recovery from some damages not available under some
state jurisdictions-particularly the availability of pre-death pain
and suffering and survivor damages. Punitive damages, while
not recoverable under the Warsaw Convention and DOHSA,
might be recoverable against non-carrier aviation defendants.
Within the nine miles between territorial waters and the
twelve mile territorial boundary for DOHSA, some general mari-
time law will apply. Before Moragne, decided in 1970, state law
was routinely applied for non-crew deaths in state waters. As the
Calhoun court announced by its application of Moragne general
maritime law to state waters, much of the gap has been filled
369 See id.
370 Note the number of years of litigation, from the time of the aircraft crash to
the final court decision in such cases as: In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland (1 1
years); Dooley (15 years); Korean Airlines (15 years).
371 See generally Melissa Pucciarelli, Compensating Victims of Aviation Disasters: Es-
tablishing Uniform and Equitable Remedies for Accidents Over Water, 24 FORDHAM
INT'L. L.J. 889, 938 (2001) (noting currently three plus bodies of law now govern
navigable water incidents).
372 In Re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.
373 Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
374 See Szollosy v. Hyatt Corp. 208 F. Supp. 2d 205, 213 (D.C. Conn. 2002)
(finding admiralty in ajet ski accident).
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between state waters and DOHSA. The Calhoun court articu-
lated that "Congress has not prescribed remedies for the wrong-
ful deaths of non-seafarers in territorial waters." Courts are
therefore required to provide a means to fill the gap and
Moragne should be used to provide a maritime law remedy for
wrongful death claims.
For families seeking recovery for the loss of loved ones, there
is certainly a need for simplification and equity.3 75 Still at issue
would be federal circuit court symmetry regarding survival ac-
tions. Pre-death injuries and pain and suffering damages should
follow the lead of the Ninth and Fifth Circuits and provide re-
covery. Even in the case of survivor issues, still left unresolved by
Dooley, there is a body of law allowing recovery for pain and suf-
fering under maritime law where there is proof of something
more than instantaneous death. 6 Although Dooley was decided
on a statutory construction basis, finding differences between
the Jones Act and DOHSA crucial to the ultimate decision that
pre-death pain and suffering were not covered by DOHSA, the
decision was not dispositive 77 In fact, the Dooley court con-
cluded its ruling by saying it did not decide "[whether] general
maritime law [ever] provides a survival action. 3 78
So what should happen when fortuosity or happenstance
place an aircraft accident in the territorial waters-between the
beach and twelve nautical miles, or between state boundaries
and twelve miles? The answer in In re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, is
that general maritime law should be applicable when no other
statute or Warsaw Convention provisions limit recovery or pre-
375 See Christine Anne Guard, Counterpoint: An Excerpt From-Dooley v. Korean Air
Lines Co.: Are Survival Actions Lost to Davey Jones' Locker where DOHSA Applies?, 23
TUL. MAR. L.J. 245 (1998) (discussing the unfairness of the difference remedies
available). If a passenger crashes into the sea within a marine league of shore, he
could recover not only pecuniary damages in a wrongful action under the gen-
eral maritime law, but also potentially non-pecuniary damages in a survival action
under state law. Meanwhile the passenger on a plane that crashes into the high
seas beyond the marine league limit will only recover pecuniary damages. Id.
376 See Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. at 213. See also Major B. Harding, Judicial
Decision-Making Analysis of Federalism in Modern United States Supreme Court Maritime
Cases, 75 TUL. L. REv. 1517, 1548-50 (2001) (Moragne provided a floor, not a
ceiling to wrongful death claims).
377 Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 524 U.S. 116 (1998).
378 Id. at 120. Some perceive this aspect of the law unclear because Dooley was
brought only under a DOHSA cause of action.
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scribe other remedies." 9 Court dockets could be streamlined,
both by the reduction of substantive law application, and the
ability to hear all of the claims under one body of law. Procedu-
ral efficiency would save both time and money.
Ultimately, families receive the greatest benefit. Although
money can never compensate for the real loss of a loved one,
monetary compensation is the recognized vehicle for legal rem-
edy in aviation accidents. "Fortuosity" should never determine
the recovery outcome of death or injury in aviation accidents.
The nature of air travel is such that arbitrary boundaries seem
meaningless, and a system that values life differently based upon
an incident occurring on land or on sea is arbitrary and unjust.
Instead, the courts should provide equitable application of uni-
form legal remedies in airline disasters, including a concerted
effort to utilize the long-standing laws of admiralty to determine
damages in aviation incidents over navigable waters.
379 Applicable statutes include the Jones Act, OSCLA, and other federal stat-
utes. In a Warsaw Convention case, the law of the forum would apply, including
the forum's conflict of law statutes.
